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I. INTRODUCTION
The British House of Lords recently considered whether
Augusto Pinochet was subject to arrest and possible extradition to
Spain for alleged acts of torture and other egregious conduct
carried out during his reign as Chile's head of state.1 The Law
Lords held that a large majority of the charges against Pinochet
were not proper grounds for extradition under British law. They
also held, however, that Pinochet could potentially be extradited
for alleged acts of torture committed after Britain's 1988 ratifica·
tion of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.2 In reaching this latter
conclusion, a majority of the Law Lords rejected Pinochet's claim
that he was entitled to immunity from arrest on the torture charges
because of his status as a former head of state.
The Pinochet decision implicates a number of difficult issues at
the heart of modem international law. It illustrates the growing
tension between the international law principle of sovereign equal·
ity and the quest for universal justice. It raises the question of
whether international criminal law should be enforced unilaterally
by national courts or through multilateral international tribunals.
And it highlights the more fundamental issue of whether any inter·
national criminal process is appropriate when a nation, like Chile,
has addressed the human rights abuses of a prior regime through a
domestic political compromise that facilitated a transition to
democracy.
Although ·these international law issues are relevant to this
article, they are not its focus. The article focuses instead on a re·
lated issue also implicated in

Pinochet:

international law's increas·

ing interaction with and influence on domestic law and processes.
In particular, we consider what, if anything, can be learned from

Pinochet

regarding the relationship between international law and

U.S. domestic law. The specific circumstances of the Pinochet case
- criminal extradition proceedings against a former head of state
1. See Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.)
[hereinafter Second Law Lords' Decision]. Judicial appeals to the House of Lords are heard
by the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, or "Law Lords." Most appeals are heard by five Law
Lords, but cases considered especially important are sometimes heard by seven. The Law
Lords act as the final court of appeal for all civil cases in Great Britain and for all criminal
cases in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. See FIONA CoWNIE & ANTHONY BRADNEY,
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM IN C ONTEXT 41-45 {1996); GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, PRIN·
CIPLES OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 61-62 (1997).
2. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention].
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- will not arise often in the United States. For the past two
decades, however, U.S. courts have been grappling with issues simi
lar to those presented in

Pinochet

in numerous civil suits alleging

violations of international human rights law by foreign officials.
The parties and judges in the

Pinochet

case extensively considered

this U.S. case law in analyzing whether Pinochet was entitled to im
munity. In this article, we in effect do the opposite: we assess how
the

Pinochet

decision and its international law holdings might be

relevant to U.S. civil litigation.
Plaintiffs and commentators are likely to claim that the Law
Lords' analysis in

Pinochet

-

especially their reliance on inter

national human rights law to limit Pinochet's immunity - supports
application of international human rights law by U.S. courts in civil
litigation. The bulk of this article is devoted to showing why this is
not so. Because of structural differences between the criminal and
civil contexts, as well as differences between the British and U.S.
approaches to the incorporation of international law, we conclude
that Pinochet provides little support for civil human rights litigation
against foreign officials in U.S. courts. We also argue that, because
of the vagueness of international human rights law and the adverse
foreign relations implications of civil suits against foreign officials,
human rights litigation in U.S. courts should remain both limited in
scope and under the control of the federal political branches. Not
only is there nothing in the Pinochet decision to the contrary, but in
several ways it bolsters our conclusions.
We begin in Part II by describing the background and proceed
ings of the Pinochet case, the House of Lords' analysis, and the in
ternational

law uncertainties highlighted

by

the Law Lords'

decision. In Part III, we consider whether developments in inter
national human rights law should limit the scope of the domestic
immunity available to foreign governments and officials. The Law
Lords held that these

developments

did limit the scope of

Pinochet's immunity from criminal process in Great Britain. In the
United States, however, the political branches and the federal
courts have, with narrow and specific exceptions, declined to permit
developments in international human rights law to limit the scope
of foreign sovereign immunity from civil process. We argue that the
adverse political consequences that might fl.ow from otherwise un
fettered private lawsuits against foreign officials for human rights
abuses justify the broader immunities available in U.S. domestic
courts.

[Vol. 97:2129
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In Part IV, we consider the legitimacy of the U.S. counterpart to
the British rule, invoked by some of the Law Lords in Pinochet, that
customary international law (CIL) is part of the British common
law. In' the United States, plaintiffs and scholars have argued for a
similar rule of incorporation to justify the domestic application of
substantive international human rights law. As we explain, how
ever, the constitutional implications of an automatically incorpo
rated CIL are more problematic for the United States than they are
for Great Britain. As a result, when faced with claims of interna
tional immunity, such as the claim of head-of-state immunity that
was at issue in Pinochet, U.S. courts do not apply the CIL governing
this immunity directly.

Instead, they seek and follow political

branch direction. The failure by courts to apply CIL as automati
cally incorporated common law in this context, involving traditional
rules of CIL that are a central component of international relations,
casts substantial doubt on the claim that international human rights
law should be applied as self-executing federal common law.
In Part V, we defend the United States' general resistance to the
domestic application of international human rights law. This resist
ance has two dimensions. First, the United States does not apply
international human rights law to domestic officials. This approach
is justified by the profound uncertainty regarding the source and
content of international law and by the general adequacy of U.S.
domestic human rights protections. Second, the United States per
mits the domestic application of international human rights law
against foreign governmental officials only in very narrow contexts.
This limited embrace of international human rights law reflects a
legitimate concern with giving private citizens, and unelected
judges, too much influence over U.S. foreign relations. As we ex
plain, both of these justifications for resistance to the domestic ap
plication of international human rights law - the vagueness of
international norms and the danger that private lawsuits will inter
fere with foreign relations - find support in the House of Lords'
decision in

Pinochet.
II.

THE PINOCHET CASE

In this Part, we analyze the

Pinochet case.

We begin by explain

ing the background of the case and the complex proceedings lead
ing up to the House of Lords' decision. We then discuss some of
the many legal uncertainties highlighted by the decision.

Pinochet
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Background and Proceedings3

Pinochet's Reign and Status. In 1973, Pinochet, then the com
mander in chief of the army in Chile, led a military coup that over
turned the elected government of President Salvador Allende. A
military junta subsequently appointed Pinochet president of Chile,
and he ruled the country for the next seventeen years. During his
rule, hundreds of thousands of people were detained for political
reasons, and several thousand disappeared or were killed. Pinochet
stepped down as president in 1990, but he remained head of the
army until March 1998, when he was appointed "Senator for Life."
Pinochet's Arrest. On September 22, 1998, at the age of 82,
Pinochet entered the United Kingdom for back surgery. On Octo
ber 16, British authorities arrested him while he was recovering
from the surgery in a London hospital. They based the arrest on a
provisional warrant issued by a British magistrate, which was in
turn based on an international arrest warrant issued by a judge in
Spain.4 The international warrant alleged that Pinochet was re
sponsible for murdering Spanish citizens in Chile between 1973 and
1983 and that Spain intended to seek his extradition. On October
22, a British magistrate issued a second provisional warrant based
on a new international warrant from the Spanish judge alleging that
Pinochet was responsible for acts of torture, hostage taking, and
other conduct committed primarily, although not exclusively,
against Chilean citizens in Chile. To understand the legal context of
these warrants and the subsequent proceedings, it is necessary to
consider briefly the international law concept of "universal juris
diction," as well as British law concerning extradition and
immunity.
Universal Jurisdiction. International law normally requires that
a nation that regulates conduct outside its territory have some con
nection with the conduct or the person engaged in the conduct. In
ternational law also recognizes, however, the concept of "universal
jurisdiction," pursuant to which certain categories of conduct can be
regulated by any nation.5 The theory is that those who engage in
this conduct are hostis humani generis, or "enemies of all mankind,"
3. Unless otherwise specified, the facts in this section are drawn from the various
opinions in the case.
4. For a description of how the proceedings against Pinochet were initiated in Spain, see
Richard J. Wilson, Prosecuting Pinochet in Spain, 6 HUM. Rrs. Br. 3 (1999).
5. See generally REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 404 (1987); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International
Law, 66 TEXAS L. REv. 785 (1988) [hereinafter Universal Jurisdiction].

2134
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and that all nations therefore have an interest in punishing them.6
In the nineteenth century, nations invoked this concept to justify
regulation of piracy on the high seas and, in some instances, the
slave trade.7 After World War II, national courts and international
war tribunals asserted universal jurisdiction over war crimes and
crimes against humanity.8 Modern treaties appear to authorize uni
versal jurisdiction over certain additional crimes, such as torture,
hostage taking, and hijacking.9
The universal jurisdiction concept was relevant to the

Pinochet

case in several ways. First, Spain invoked this concept as a basis for
regulating, and requesting extradition for, Pinochet's alleged con
duct. The torture, hostage taking, and other acts allegedly commit
ted by Pinochet took place primarily in Chile. Moreover, most of
the victims were not Spanish citizens, and Pinochet was not himself
a Spanish citizen. Nevertheless, the universal jurisdiction concept
allowed Spain to claim authority under international law to regulate
Pinochet's conduct. Second, this concept played an important role
in the House of Lords' application of British extradition law. His
torically, torture was not an extraterritorial crime in Britain. In
1988, however, Britain enacted a criminal statute authorizing uni
versal jurisdiction over official acts of torture committed anywhere
in the world.10 As explained below, the House of Lords ultimately
found that acts of torture committed by Pinochet before the enact
ment of this statute were not a proper basis for extradition. Finally,
some of the Law Lords invoked the universal jurisdiction concept
as a justification for limiting Pinochet's head-of-state immunity.

6. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN.
349, 416-17 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Questions]; see also Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 890 {2d Cir. 1980) ("[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before hinI - hostis humani generis, an enemy of all
L. RE.v.

mankind.").

7. See Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after Ftlartiga v. Pena-lrala, 22 HARV,
lNrL. L.J. 53, 60-62 {1981). But cf Al.FRED P. RUBIN, ETHICS AND AUTIIORITY IN INTERNA·
TIONAL LAW 84-110 (1997) (arguing that the nineteenth century piracy and slave trade cases
all involved connections to the regulating state).

8. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 805-10. The universal jurisdiction
concept was invoked by Israel, for example, as a basis for trying Adolf Eichmann after it
abducted hinI from Argentina. See Cr.A. 333/61, Attorney Gen. of Isr. v. Eichmann, 16 P.D.
2033, 2047, 2060-67, 36 l.L.R. 5, 287, 298-304 (S. Ct. 1962) (Isr.).
9. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction, supra note 5, at 816-19.
10. See Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33, § 134, reprinted in 12 HALSBURY's STATUTES
OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1079 (4th ed. 1997).
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Britain's Extradition Statute. Extradition in Great Britain is gov
erned by its 1989 Extradition Act.11 This Act provides that a per
son who is in Great Britain and is accused in a foreign state of an
"extradition crime" may be "arrested and returned" to that state if
the state has an extradition treaty with Great Britain.12 The Act
defines an extradition crime as either an offense committed within
the territory of the foreign state or an extraterritorial offense
against the law of the foreign state.13 For extraterritorial offenses,
however, either the foreign state must base its jurisdiction on the
nationality of the offender, or the crime charged must be such that
"in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would consti
tute an extra-territorial offence against the law of the United
Kingdom."14 In extradition parlance, this is a form of "double
criminality" requirement.15 The Act also makes clear that extradi
tion proceedings cannot be carried out without the approval of
Britain's Home Secretary.16 The Act does allow, however, for an
initial arrest and preliminary proceedings based, as in the

Pinochet

case, on the issuance of a "provisional warrant."17
Great Britain has a statute regulating
foreign governmental immunity in its courts.18 This statute specifi

Britain's Immunity Law.

cally includes heads of state in its list of entities entitled to sover
eign immunity . in civil litigation.19 Of more relevance to the

Pinochet

case, the statute also provides that, "subject to . .. any

necessary modifications," heads of state shall be entitled to the im
munities accorded to diplomats.20 Britain's diplomatic immunity
statute, in tum, accords diplomats absolute criminal immunity while
11.

See Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, reprinted in 17 liALsBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND

AND WALES 558 (4th ed. 1993).

12. Extradition Act § 1(1). The pertinent international extradition agreement between
the United Kingdom and Spain is the European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957,
U.K.-Spain, 359 U.N.T.S. 273.
13.

See Extradition Act§ 2(1).

14. Extradition Act§ 2(2).
15. For

an

introduction to the concept of double criminality, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
AND PRACTICE 388-93 (3d ed. 1996).

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADmoN: UNITED STATES LAW

16. See Extradition Act § 7(1). The Act refers generally to the "Secretary of State."
There are a number of secretaries of state in Great Britain, each with different responsibili
ties. Responsibilities relating to extradition have been assigned to the Home Secretary. See
HILAIRE BARNET!', CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 786-87 (2d ed. 1998).
17. See Extradition Act§ 8(1)(b). A provisional warrant may be issued prior to the re
ceipt of an authorization by the Home Secretary to proceed with extradition. See § 8(1)(b).
The Home Secretary has the power to cancel such a warrant, and he must do so if he decides
not to issue an authorization to proceed. See § 8(4).
18.

See State !=unity Act, 1978, ch. 33 (Eng.), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123.
See State !=unity Act§ 14(1)(a).
20. See State !=unity Act§ 20(1).
19.
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they are serving as part of a diplomatic mission.21 This form of im
munity, known as immunity

"ratione personae, "

is a status

immunity

that attaches to diplomats - and, by reference, to heads of state as the personal embodiment of the foreign state during their time in
service. After their service ceases, diplomats - and, by reference,
heads of state - are then entitled to criminal immunity for the acts
they performed while carrying out their official functions.22 This
form of immunity, known as immunity

ject matter immunity

"ratione materiae, "

is a sub

that prevents the official acts of one state from

being called into question in the courts of another.23

Divisional Court Decision.

Pinochet challenged his arrest in

court and, on October 28, a three-judge panel of the Divisional
Court of the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice
held both provisional arrest warrants invalid.24 The court held that
the first warrant failed to comply with the double criminality re
quirement because British law would not allow for jurisdiction over
the murder of a British citizen committed abroad. The court fur
ther held that both warrants were invalid because, as a former head
of state, Pinochet was entitled to immunity from arrest. The court
acknowledged that Pinochet's alleged acts were criminal under in
ternational law but noted that "[a] former head of state is clearly
entitled to immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the
course of exercising public functions. "25 Britain's Crown Prosecu
tion Service appealed the decision on behalf of Spain, and several
human rights groups, including Amnesty International, intervened
in the appeal. In the meantime, Spain issued a formal extradition
request that substantially expanded the number and description of
crimes allegedly committed by Pinochet, adding, among other
things, a charge of genocide.

First Law Lords' Decision.

On November 25, a five-member

panel of the House of Lords overturned the Divisional Court's rul
ing.26 As is customary, the decision took the form of seriatim opin
ions. The Law Lords held, by a 3-2 majority, that Pinochet was not
21. See Diplomatic Privileges Act, 1964, ch. 81, sched. l, art. 29, reprinted in
HA!.sBURY's STATUTES OF ENGLAND AND WALES 676, 682 (4th ed. 1995).
22. See Diplomatic Privileges Act § 39.
23. For a general discussion of the distinction between immunity ratione personae and
immunity ratione materiae, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
10

330-31 (4th ed. 1990).

24. See In re an Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum re: Augusto
Pinochet Ugarte, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div!. Ct. 1998) [hereinafter Divisional Court Decision].
25.

Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M. at 83 (Lord Bingham).
See R egin a v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet, [1998) 3 W.L.R. 1456 (H.L.) [hereinafter First
Law Lords' Decision].
26.

Pinochet
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entitled to immunity for the acts alleged in the second arrest war
rant. They reasoned that the immunity of former heads of state
does not apply to acts of torture and hostage taking because such
acts do not constitute official functions of a head of state under in
ternational law.27 As one member of the majority explained,
international law has made plain that certain types of conduct, includ
ing torture and hostage-taking, are not acceptable conduct on the part
of anyone. This applies as much to heads of state, or even more so, as
it does to everyone else; the contrary conclusion would make a mock
ery of international law.28

The dissenters argued, by contrast, that head-of-state immunity ap
plies to illegal acts and has not been abrogated by relevant treaties
or custom.29

In early December, Britain's Home Secretary authorized the ex
tradition proceedings to go forward, except with respect to the
charge

of

genocide.30

Shortly

thereafter,

Pinochet's

lawyers

petitioned the House of Lords to vacate the panel decision.because
one member of the majority had failed to disclose that he was an
unpaid director of a fund-raising arm of Amnesty International.
On December 17, the House of Lords, in an unprecedented step,
granted the request and vacated the decision.31

Second Law Lords' Decision.

A seven-member panel of the

House of Lords reheard the appeal in January and early February
1999. The government of Chile intervened in these proceedings
and argued for Pinochet's release. During the proceedings,
Britain's Crown Prosecutor submitted a schedule stating that
Spain's allegations against Pinochet - with the exception of the
genocide charge - would constitute thirty-two violations of British
criminal law. On March 24, 1999, after seven weeks of deliberation,
the House of Lords issued its second decision.
The second decision differed significantly from the first. It did
not reach the head-of-state immunity issue until after it had first
dismissed, on the basis of double criminality, a large majority of the
extradition charges against Pinochet. As noted above, the British
27. See First Law Lords' Decision, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1499-1502 (Lord Nicholls), 1506
(Lord Steyn), 1508 (Lord Hoffman).
28. [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1500 (Lord Nicholls).
29. See [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1476-78 (Lord Slynn), 1492-93 (Lord Lloyd).
30. See 38 I.L.M. 489 (1999) (statement of Jack Straw, Home Secretary). The Home Sec
retary did not authorize extradition proceedings on the genocide charge because he con
cluded that the double criminality requirement was not satisfied with respect to that charge.
See id.
31. See In re Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 272 (H.L.) (oral judgment delivered on December
17, 1998, written reasons on January 15, 1999).

·
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extradition statute allows extradition for extraterritorial offenses if
"in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would consti
tute an extraterritorial offense against the law of the United
Kingdom. "32 The Divisional Court had concluded with little analy
sis that this requirement meant simply that the conduct must be a
crime under British law

at the time of the extradition request. 33

The

first House of Lords' decision appeared to reach the same conclu
sion on this point, again with little analysis.34 In the second deci
sion, by contrast, the Law Lords considered the issue in detail.35
They held unanimously that the extradition statute requires the ex
traterritorial conduct to have been a crime under British law at the

time the conduct took place.

Most of the charges against Pinochet,

including most of the charges regarding torture, concerned conduct
prior to September 29, 1988, the date when Great Britain made tor
ture an extraterritorial crime. Six of the seven Law Lords con
cluded that these charges therefore could not serve as a basis for
extradition.36
After reaching this conclusion regarding double criminality, and
after dismissing the hostage-taking charge on the merits,37 the Law
Lords were left with charges relating to torture and conspiracy to
commit torture after September 29, 1988, and with charges of con

spiracy in Spain to co:rllmit murder and torture in Spain. It was with

respect to these charges that the Law Lords considered the issue of
immunity. Six of the Law Lords agreed that Pinochet was generally
32. Extradition Act, 1989, ch. 33, § 2(2), reprinted in 17 HALSBURY's STATUTES OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 558, 561 (4th ed. 1993).
33. See Divisional Court Decision, 38 I.L.M. 68, 79 (Q.B. Div!. Ct. 1998) (Lord Bingham)
("[T]he conduct alleged against the subject of the request need not in my judgment have
been criminal here at the time the alleged crime was committed abroad."). The Home
Secretary relied on this holding in his statement authorizing extradition proceedings to go
forward.
34. See First Law Lords' Decision, [1998] 3 W.L.R. at 1481 (Lord Lloyd) (noting that he
"agree[d] with the Divisional Court that [the argument that the conduct must have been
criminal in Great Britain when it occurred] is bad").
35. Apparently, Pinochet's lawyers revived this argument during the second House of
Lords' hearing in response to the Crown Prosecution Service's attempt to extend the charges
against Pinochet to include conduct allegedly committed before Pinochet was head of state.
See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 833 (H.L.) (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
36. Lord Millett dissented on this point, reasoning that extraterritorial torture was a com
mon law crime in Britain before the Convention came into force, and thus satisfied the
double criminality requirement. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 912
(Lord Millett). The Law Lords also dismissed the non-torture charges on double criminality
grounds; the complex reasons for the dismissal are set forth in Lord Hope's opinion. See
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 870-71 (Lord Hope).
37. The Law Lords concluded that the charges against Pinochet relating to hostage taking
failed to state a claim under Britain's 1982 Hostage Taking Act because there was no allega
tion that the hostage taking was designed to compel action or inaction by third parties. See
[1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 850 (Lord Goff), 871 (Lord Hope).
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entitled to immunity under both British statutory law and inter
national law for criminal conduct committed while carrying out his
functions as head of state.38 Six of the Law Lords also concluded,
however, that this former-head-of-state immunity did not cover acts
of torture and conspiracy to commit torture committed after
December 8, 1988, the date Britain ratified the Torture Convention.
This is the most important holding in the case. Lord Goff dissented
from this holding, arguing that Pinochet was entitled to immunity
even for post-1988 acts of torture because neither the Torture
Convention nor CIL abrogated former-head-of-state immunity.39
Three features of the Law Lords' decision have special rele
vance to this article. First, several of the Law Lords who embraced
the head-of-state immunity holding drew a distinction between im
munity in a criminal proceeding and immunity in civil litigation. 40
They acknowledged and appeared to agree with case authority, es
pecially U.S. case authority, supporting immunity in civil litigation
for torture and other egregious acts. Second, the Law Lords looked
to CIL to interpret the scope of British immunity law, in part be
cause they concluded that British statutory law refers to CIL princi
ples, but also because of the long-standing British rule that CIL is
incorporated as part of the common law. Finally, six of the Law
Lords expressed the view that the Home Secretary should recon
sider his authorization of the extradition proceedings in light of the
substantial reduction in the scope of the charges resulting from the
Law Lords' decision.41

New Authorization to Proceed.

On April 14, the Home

Secretary issued a second authorization allowing the extradition
proceedings against Pinochet to go forward. The Home Secretary
concluded, among other things, that the House of Lords' reduction
of the extradition charges against Pinochet did not warrant dismis
sal of the case.42 He noted that he had wide discretion in deciding
whether to authorize extradition proceedings and that he had taken
38. Lord Phillips dissented on this point, reasoning that the immunity statute gave
Pinochet immunity only for acts committed in Great Britain. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 927
(Lord Phillips).
39. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 862 (Lord Goff).
40. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 889 (Lord Hutton), 913 (Lord Millett), 921 (Lord Phillips).
41. Several of the Law Lords also noted that if the Home Secretary did permit the pro

ceedings to continue, the magistrate presiding over the extradition proceedings should care
fully review the evidence concerning the remaining alleged crimes to ensure that these crimes
satisfied the double criminality requirement.

42. See 329 PARL. DEB., H.C. (Hansard) 311, 315 (1998) (statement of Jack Straw, Home

Secretary).
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a range of factors into consideration. 43 In addition to assessing the
legal grounds for extradition, the Home Secretary considered a
number of nonlegal factors, including "the possible effect of extra
dition proceedings on the stability of Chile, and its future democ
racy; and . . . the possible effect of extradition proceedings on the
UK national interest. "44 As of this writing, Pinochet remains under
house arrest in England, and extradition proceedings are scheduled
to begin in late September, 1999.
B.

In the

Pinochet

International Law Uncertainties
case, three different judicial panels examined

the immunity issue, and each panel adopted a different approach.
Moreover, although most of the Law Lords in the latest decision
agreed that Pinochet was not entitled to immunity for acts of tor
ture committed after December 8, 1988, their reasoning in support
of this conclusion is unclear and often contradictory. In this sec
tion, we analyze the Law Lords' justifications for denying Pinochet
immunity. Our analysis is not intended as an argument against the
House of Lords' ultimate holding. Instead, our aim is to illustrate
how open-ended and uncertain the law is in this area.
A majority of the Law Lords suggested that a former head of
state like Pinochet traditionally would have been entitled to immu
nity for acts of torture under international law. 45 Most of the Law
Lords also agreed that something happened in or by 1988 to limit
this immunity. No clear answer emerges from the Law Lords' opin
ions, however, as to how or why this limitation came about. 46
A head of state's government holds the right to the head-of
state immunity, and may therefore waive it. 47 One possible basis
for the limitation of immunity, therefore, is that Chile waived im
munity in 1988 when it ratified the Torture Convention. Any such
waiver, however, must have been implicit, since the Convention
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id. at 316.
45. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),
855 (Lord Goff), 886 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord Saville).
46. Lord Phillips was the only Law Lord to deny the premise that former heads of state
had a traditional immunity from criminal process under international law. He reasoned that,
because national jurisdiction over universal crimes was a recent and rare phenomenon, there
was in fact no CIL practice of granting former heads of state immunity from criminal process.
See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 918 (Lord Phillips).
47. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville), 906 (Lord Millett), 924 (Lord Phillips); see
also BROWNLIE, supra note 23, at 340. For U.S. decisions to this effect, see, e.g., In Re Doe,
860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) and In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 817 F.2d 1108, 1110 (4th
Cir. 1987).
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does not mention immunity. As several Law Lords pointed out,
implicit waivers of immunity are disfavored under international
law.48 Perhaps for this reason, a number of the Law Lords dis
avowed a waiver theory.49 Also inconsistent with a waiver theory is
the Law Lords' agreement that the relevant date in 1988 was not
the date that Chile ratified the Convention, October 30, but rather
the date that Britain ratified it, December 8.so
It appears, therefore, that most of the Law Lords relied on the
theory that Pinochet's immunity was

abrogated rather than waived.
In other words, they concluded that something happened in or by
1988 that overrode Pinochet's immunity as a matter of law. For
some - and perhaps most - of the Law Lords, the abrogation
stemmed from the Torture Convention.51 The Convention's abro
gation of former-head-of-state immunity would not likely have
been effective with respect to the circumstances of the Pinochet
case until all three interested countries - Spain, Chile, and Britain
- had ratified the Convention. This would explain the Law Lords'
holding that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated as of December 8,
the date of Britain's ratification, because Britain was the last of
these three countries to ratify the treaty.
The abrogation theory nevertheless suffers from a number of
difficulties. In a world of equal sovereign states, it is unclear why
an abrogation of immunity can be accomplished by a weaker show
ing of consent than a waiver of immunity. A possible answer is that
abrogation of immunity for torture was, as of 1988, a jus cogens
norm - a rule of international law considered binding on nations
48.

See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 882 (Lord Hope), 857 (Lord Goff), 904 (Lord Saville).

49. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 886 (Lord Hope), 900 (Lord Hutton); see also [1999] 2 W.L.R.
at 913 (Lord Millett) ("I do not regard [Chile] as having thereby waived its immunity. In my
opinion there was no immunity to be waived."). But see [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 904 (Lord
Saville) ("[I]t seems to me that the express and unequivocal terms of the Torture Convention
fulfil any such [waiver] requirement.").
50. One Law Lord thought that October 30 was the appropriate date, but he was none
theless "content to accept" the December 8 date. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 887 (Lord Hope).
51. We say "perhaps most" because the five Law Lords who believed that Pinochet's
immunity was abrogated in 1988 invoked the Torture Convention in very diff erent ways.
Lords Browne-Wtlkinson and Saville thought that the Torture Convention per se abrogated
Pinochet's immunity. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 904 (Lord
Saville). Lords Hutton and Millett agreed that Pinochet's immunity claim could not survive
the Torture Convention, but they left open the possibility that it was abrogated prior to the
Convention because of torture's status as a jus cogens crime. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 897-99
(Lord Hutton), 912 (Lord Millett). Lord Hope believed that Chile's ratification of the
Convention was the event that abrogated Pinochet's immunity. He did not think that the
Convention by itself caused this abrogation but thought instead that this was caused by the
development of a CIL of international criminal law, of which the Convention constituted the
final step. See [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 886-87 (Lord Hope).
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regardless of their consent.52 However, while it is true that several
of the Law Lords described

cogens

the prohibition on torture

as a

jus

norm - and Chile apparently conceded as much53 - none

of them described the

abrogation of immunity

as such a norm. In

deed, several of the Law Lords who thought that Pinochet's immu
nity had been abrogated denied that the

jus cogens

status of the

prohibition

by

to

on

torture

was

enough,

itself,

abrogate

immunity.54
Another problem with the abrogation theory, as with the waiver
theory, is the absence of any reference to immunity in the Torture
Convention. The plain language of the Convention makes torture a
crime without speaking to the issue of whether particular violators
can claim immunity from foreign court prosecution. The immunity
issue also appears nowhere in the treaty's legislative history, or

"travaux preparatoires."55

These omissions seem especially signifi

cant in light of the fact that the drafters of a number of other inter
national crimes treaties and statutes have seen fit to override
immunity in express terms.56
52. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S.
332, 344 (defining a jus cogens norm as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which
can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character").
53. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 841 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson),
898-99 (Lord Hutton), 912-13 (Lord Millett), 924 (Lord Phillips).
54. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
55. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 860 (Lord Goff), 884 (Lord Hope). The standard treatise on
the Convention, which was coauthored by the Convention's Rapporteur (Burgers), is J.
HERMAN BURGERS & HANs DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TOR·
TURE (1988). This book mentions immunity only once. In its commentary on the require
ment in Article 5 of the Convention that a nation establish jurisdiction over a torture offense
cofillnitted within its territory, the commentary notes that
[u]nder international or national law, there may be certain limited exceptions to this
rule, e.g. in regard to foreign diplomats, foreign troops, parliament members or other
categories benefiting from special immunities, and such immunities may be accepted in
so far as they apply to criminal acts in general and are not unduly extensive.
Id. at 131. As Lord Hope noted, this passage is "so cryptic as to defy close analysis," Second
Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 884 (Lord Hope), but it does appear to recognize
that CIL immunities may be consistent with the Convention, and it further suggests that the
framers of the Convention did not specifically consider the issue of former-head-of-state
immunity.
56. See, e.g., Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat. 1544, 1548, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 (contain
ing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg) ("The official position
of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government Depart
ments, shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punish
ment."); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.9,
1948, art. 4, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 ("Persons committing genocide .. . shall be
punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private indi
viduals."); Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Res
olution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M.
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These reasons probably explain why most of the Law Lords who
relied on the Torture Convention to abrogate Pinochet's immunity
rested their conclusion more on the purposes of the Convention
than on its language.57 Because the Convention applies only to offi
cial conduct, they argued that it would have little or no effect unless
it abrogated official immunity. One strand of this argument empha
sized that a former head of state is the person most likely to have
been responsible for official acts of torture and thus should not be
able to avoid the proscriptions of the Convention.58 Another
strand emphasized that official immunities under CIL extend not
only to heads of state, but also to other government officials carry
ing out state functions. As a result, the argument goes, if immunity
is not abrogated, "the whole elaborate structure of universal juris
diction over torture committed by officials· [would be] rendered
abortive."59
There are many potential objections to this purpose-based argu
ment for abrogation of immunity.60 As Lord Goff's dissent noted,
the availability of former-head-of-state immunity in foreign courts
does not in fact negate the effect of the Convention. Most instances
of torture by public officials will be committed in the state in which
1 16 1, 1 194 (1993) (establishing the international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and con
taining that tribunal's statute); S.C. Res.955, U.N. SCO R, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg.at 6, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted in 33 l.L.M. 1598, 1604 (1994) (establishing the interna
tional tribunal for Rwanda and containing that tribunal's statute) ("The official position of
any accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Govern
ment official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punish
ment."); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.27(1), U.N.Doc.A/CONF.
183/9 (1998) ("[O]fficial capacity as a Head of State or Government ... shall in no case
exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself,
constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.").
57. See Second Law Lor ds' Decision, [ 1 9 9 9 ] 2 W . L . R . at 8 4 7-4 8 ( L o r d
Browne-Wilkinson), 9 14 (Lord Millett), 925 (Lord Phillips). Only Lord Saville thought the
"express terms " of the Torture Convention abrogated former-head-of-state immunity. See
[1999] 2 W.L.R.at 904 (Lord Saville). The "express terms " Saville had in mind are contained
in Article 1 of the Convention, which states that the Convention applies to torture "inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity." Torture Convention, supra note 2, art. 1, S. T REATY
Doc. No. 100-20, at 19 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.at 1 14. Counsel for Chile conceded that this
language encompasses heads of state but argued that the language did not abrogate immu
nity. See [1999] 2 W.L.R.at 854 (Lord Goff).
58. See, e.g., [1999] 2 W.L.R.at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson) ("[I]f the former head of
state has immunity, the man most responsible will escape liability while his inferiors (the
chiefs of police, junior army officers) who carried out his orders will be liable.").
59. [1999] 2 W.L.R.at 847 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson).
60. According to Lord Goff, the argument was raised for the first time during the second
hearing before the House of Lords, had previously "been overlooked by fourteen counsel
(including three distinguished Professors of International Law) acting for the appellants and
for Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, " and "receives no support from the
literature on the subject[,] and ...appears never to have been advanced before." [1999] 2
W.L.R.at 856 (Lord Goff).
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the official resides, where the Convention's prohibition on torture

will apply without any international immunity defense. In addition,
the Convention's criminal prohibitions could also be applied by
other nations in cases where the former-head-of-state's government
is willing to waive immunity. Another problem with the purpose
based immunity argument stems from the belief of several Law
Lords that torture was an international crime under CIL prior to
the Convention. 6 1 These same Law Lords also believed that a
former head of state retained immunity during this pre-Convention
period. 6 2 Yet they failed to explain why official immunities were
consistent with the international crime of torture established by
custom but not consistent with the international crime of torture
established by treaty.
Perhaps the most significant problem with the purpose-based
immunity abrogation theory derives from the Law Lords' insistence
that

current

heads of state enjoy absolute immunity under inter

national law for acts of torture even after the Torture Convention. 6 3
The Convention criminalizes torture committed by public officials
and others acting in an official capacity. It no more distinguishes
between current and former heads of state than it does between
former heads of state and lower-level officials. The logic of the im
munity abrogation theory thus would seem to apply across the
board to all public officials, or not at all. If immunity for current
heads of state is not inc.onsistent with the purposes of the
Convention, it is unclear why immunity for former heads of state is
inconsistent with those purposes. Some of the Law Lords at
tempted to address this problem by pointing out that current-head
of-state immunity attaches to the office, whereas former-head-of
state immunity and lower-level official immunity apply only to par
ticular conduct. 6 4 This is simply to argue, however, that current
head-of-state immunity is not abrogated by the Torture Convention
because, unlike former-head-of-state immunity, it is absolute. This
argument begs the question of

why current-head-of-state

immunity

61. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 840-41 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 886 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord
Saville), 911-12 (Millett).
62. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 847 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 886-87 (Lord Hope), 903 (Lord
Saville), 912-14 (Lord Millett).
63. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 844-45 (Lord Browne-Wtlkinson), 898 (Lord Hutton), 903
{Lord Saville), 912 (Lord Millett), 915-16 (Lord Phillips). But see (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 852-53
(Lord Goff) (concluding that the immunity would be absolute "except in regard to crimes in
particular situations before international tribunals" (citing First Law Lords' Decision, (1998]
3 W.L.R. 1456, 1474 (H.L.) (Lord Slynn))).
64. See (1999] 2 W.L.R. at 902 (Lord Saville), 905-07 (Lord Millett).
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continues to be absolute after the Torture Convention when
former-head-of-state immunity has been restricted.
In any event, this purpose-based theory of abrogation by the
Torture Convention might not even have been the dispositive rea
son for the Law Lords' holding. Many Law Lords reasoned, or at
least insinuated, that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated in or by
1988 not because of the Convention

per se,

but rather because of

the status of torture as an "international crime" under CIL.65 The
Law Lords were extraordinarily casual in their identification of tor
ture as an international crime, relying in varying degrees on the
writings of scholars, unadopted International Law Commission
codes, and General Assembly resolutions that did not at the time of
their issuance have the status of law.66 In addition, the Law Lords
were imprecise regarding when torture became an international
crime, and why. In these respects, the Pinochet decision continues a
modem trend of identifying CIL not on the basis of customary
practice, but rather on the basis of verbal consensus as reflected in
technically nonlegal sources of law.67
More important than the casual identification of torture as an
international crime was the confusion among the Law Lords re
garding the very meaning and significance of the term "inter
national crime." Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought that state torture
was "an international crime in the highest sense" prior to the
Torture Convention but that the prohibition on torture did not ab
rogate immunity until the time of the Convention because it was
only at that point that torture was a "fully constituted international
crime."68 By contrast, Lord Hope thought that, even after the Con
vention, the prohibition on torture did not abrogate immunity un
less the torture was "on such a scale as to amount to an
international crime."69 Lord Hutton took issue with this point, ar65. Lord Hope expressly reasoned that Pinochet's immunity was abrogated by torture's
status as an international crime, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 882·83 (Lord Hope); Lords Hutton
and Millett insinuated that this might be so, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 899 (Lord Hutton), 9 1 1- 13
(Lord Millett); and torture's status as an international crime figured prominently (though
differently) in the opinions of Lords Browne-Wilkinson and Phillips, see [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at
840-42 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 924-25 (Lord Phillips).
66. See, e.g., [ 1999] 2
(Lord Millett).

W.L.R.

at 840-4 1 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 853 (Lord Goff), 9 12

67. For descriptions and analysis of this trend, compare Richard B. Lillich, The Growing
Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 GA. J. !NTL. L. 1 (1996) (argu
ing in favor of trend), with Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights
Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AuSTL. Y.B. !NTL. L. 82 (1992) (criti
cizing trend).
68.

Second Law Lords' Decision, [ 1999] 2 W.L.R. at 84 1, 847
W.L.R. at 885 (Lord Hope).

69. [ 1999] 2

(Lord Browne- Wilkinson).
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guing that, at least after the Convention, a single act of state torture
is an international crime that abrogates immunity.1° Lord Millett
agreed that Pinochet's alleged torture constituted

an

international

crime, but he rejected the notion that Pinochet had a preexisting
immunity from criminal process that needed abrogating.71 In addi
tion to these points, some of the Law Lords emphasized that the
international criminal prohibition on torture was a jus cogens norm
or was subject to universal jurisdiction.72 As other Law Lords
pointed out, however, neither the jus

cogens

status of a crime nor

the availability of universal jurisdiction over a crime by itself elimi
nates immunity.13
In sum, a majority of the Law Lords concluded that interna
tional law did not provide Pinochet with immunity from criminal
extradition process in Britain. Their opinions, however, reveal sub
stantial disagreement and confusion over why this was so. Even
though the Law Lords had the benefit of briefing and argument by
Britain's finest attorneys and international law scholars, the Law
Lords could not agree even on which aspect of international law
abrogated Pinochet's

immunity

or

how

this

abrogation

was

accomplished. 74
Ill.

PINOCHET AND

'IHE INTERNATIONAL

LAW

OVERRIDE STRATEGY

Most international human rights law, like international law gen
erally, applies only when there is a state action.75 As a result, im
munities

from

suit for foreign

officials

guaranteed

by

both

international law and domestic law constitute a major hurdle to
human rights litigation in domestic courts. We have just seen that
the Law Lords in

Pinochet interpreted the Torture

Convention and

70.

See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 90 1 (Lord Hutton).
See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 9 12- 13 (Lord Millett).
72. See, e.g., ( 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 898 (Lord Hutton).
73. See [ 1999] 2 W. L. R. at 847-48 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 88 1 (Lord Hope).
74. As we explain below in Part V, the vagueness of the sources and content of the inter
national law at issue in Pinochet is typical of international human rights law in general, and it
7 1.

helps explain why the United States has been cautious in its incorporation of this law into its
domestic legal system.
75. Except for a few categories of conduct, such as genocide and war crimes, individuals
acting on their own cannot violate international human rights law. This is true even for egre
gious human rights abuses, such as torture. The Torture Convention covers conduct by "a
public official or other person acting in an official capacity. " Torture Convention, supra note
2, art. 1 (1) (emphasis added). Such private conduct presumably will violate relevant domes
tic law, but it does not violate international law. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243
(2d Cir. 1995); Carmichael v. United Technologies Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 1 14 (5th Cir. 1988);
Beanal v. Freeport- Mc Moran, 969 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. La. 1997).
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CIL to limit Pinochet's immunity from criminal prosecution not
only under international law, but also under Britain's domestic im
munity statute. In effect, the Law Lords held that developments in
international law abrogated Pinochet's immunity on the domestic
plane. Plaintiffs in human rights litigation in the United States can
be expected to invoke this aspect of the Pinochet decision as a basis
for overcoming immunity hurdles in U.S. courts.
The Law Lords considered developments in international law
relevant to Pinochet's immunity in British courts because Britain's
State Immunity Act limits former-head-of-state immunity to acts
performed in the exercise of official functions,76 and the Law Lords
interpreted this standard as incorporating developing international
law standards. Ultimately, therefore, British domestic law deter
mined the relevance of international law to Pinochet's immunity on
the domestic plane. As we explain below, however, Great Britain
and the United States have different rules governing how the inter
national laws at issue in the Pinochet case operate within their do
mestic legal systems. In the United States, the federal political
branches have

not

authorized the incorporation of developing

norms of international law to narrow the immunities available in
U.S. courts, and federal courts generally have declined to embrace
an "international law override" of these immunities on their own
authority.77 Not only does the

Pinochet decision

not provide sup

port for such an override in U.S. courts, in several ways it actually
suggests reasons for rejecting one.
A.

Potential Relevance of Pinochet to U.S. Litigation

In this section, we explain why immunity issues analogous to the
ones at issue in Pinochet are likely to arise in the United States
primarily in the context of civil human rights litigation rather than
criminal extradition. We also explain how the House of Lords' con
struction of the British immunity statute might appear at first
glance to be relevant to this civil litigation.

Criminal Extradition.

Courts in the United States are unlikely

to address the international law immunity issues presented in

Pinochet in

the criminal extradition context. To see why, consider

76. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
77. There is nothing unusual in the fact that Great Britain and the United States have
different rules concerning whether and how international human rights law affects domestic
immunities for foreign officials. International law does not specify how nations must treat
international obligations as a matter of domestic law, and nations often differ as to whether
and how to incorporate international law into their domestic legal systems. See Lours HEN
KIN ET AL., lNmRNATIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 153 (3d ed. 1993).
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what would happen if Pinochet had come to New York rather than
London for his back operation and, while there, the United States
received an extradition request from Spain. Spain and the United
States have an extradition treaty that provides for extradition for
extraterritorial crimes.78 In addition, the United States has a crimi
nal prohibition on extraterritorial torture similar to the one in Brit
ain's Criminal Justice Act of 1988.79 For these reasons, Pinochet
would potentially be subject to extradition from the United States
to Spain for acts of torture committed in Chile.so
But would Pinochet as a former head of state be immune from
this criminal extradition process? Here there are large differences
between U.S. and British law. As discussed above, the British im
munity statute expressly provides current heads of state with abso
lute immunity from criminal process, and it provides former heads
of state with qualified immunity.81 By contrast, the primary basis of
immunity for foreign sovereigns and their officials in the United
States - the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act82

civil cases. 83

-

applies only in

Unlike in Britain, there is no statutory basis in the

United States for current- or former-head-of-state immunity from
criminal process. As we explain more fully below, the availability
of such immunity in the United States is instead a largely discre
tionary decision by the executive branch.84 Courts faced with offi
cial immunity issues in a criminal extradition context do not look to
international law; rather, they follow the wishes of the executive
branch, which in turn makes its decisions without necessarily fol
lowing international law.85 Because of this difference between U.S.
and British immunity law, the immunity holding in

Pinochet

will

have little effect on U.S. criminal extradition practice unless and to
the extent that the executive branch decides to follow it.

Civil Litigation.

To say that the Pinochet decision has little rele

vance in the criminal extradition context in the United States is not
78. See Treaty on Extradition Between the United States of America and Spain, May 29,
1970, art. III(B), 22 U.S.T. 737, 740.
79. See 18 U.S.C A. § 2340A (Supp. 1998).
80. Unlike the British Extradition Act, the United States extradition statute does not
purport to regulate either extraterritorial crimes or the principle of double criminality. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 3184-95. Instead, these issues are governed in U.S. courts in accordance with the
particular extradition treaty at issue.
81. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
82. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 940583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994)).
83. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
84. See infra Part IV.A-B.
85. See e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997).
.
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to say that it has no relevance in U.S. courts. · Courts in the United
States have for years been grappling with international law issues
similar to those presented in Pinochet in civil suits alleging viola
tions of international human rights law by foreign officials. Indeed,
the parties and judges in the Pinochet case drew heavily on U.S.
civil litigation case law in assessing whether Pinochet was immune
from criminal process in England.86 Plaintiffs in U.S. human rights
litigation can be expected, in tum, to invoke the

Pinochet decision

in support of their efforts to overcome the immunity of foreign offi
cials. To understand why

Pinochet is not likely to support these ef

forts, it is necessary first to review the statutory basis for human
rights litigation and official immunity from civil suit in the United
States.
The principal statutory vehicle for international human rights
litigation in U.S. courts has been the Alien Tort Statute (ATS).87
This statute, which originally was enacted as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, states that federal district courts shall have jurisdiction
to hear "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States . "88
Although the statute rarely was invoked during the first 190 years
of its existence,89 it assumed new significance in the 1980 Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala decision.90 That decision held that the ATS authorizes
federal court jurisdiction over suits between aliens for human rights
abuses committed abroad and that such jurisdiction is consistent
with Article III of the Constitution.91
86. See supra text accompanying note 40.
87. 28 u.s.c. § 1350.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. Tue original purposes of the ATS are uncertain. For various per
spectives, see Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of Interna
tional Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 319, 357-63 (1997) [hereinafter The
Current Illegitimacy]; Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of
1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J . INTI.. L. 461, 475-80 (1989); William R. Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Na
tions, 18 CoNN. L. REv. 467, 499-510 (1986); William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the
Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv.
221, 225-37 (1996); John M. Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate"
International Law, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNATL. L. 47, 48-60 (1988); Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A
Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 HASTINGS INTI.. & CoMP. L. REv. 445, 44647 (1995). For the best textual analysis of the ATS, see John C. Harrison, The Law ofNations
as Law of the United States in the Judiciary Act of 1789 (unpublished draft on file with
authors).
89. In 1975, Judge Henry Friendly referred to the ATS as an "old but little used section"
and as a "kind of legal Lohengrin," and stated that "no one seems to know whence it came."
IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
90. 630 F.2d 876 {2d Cir. 1980).
91. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885. For a discussion of the Article III issue, see infra text
accompanying notes 189-91.
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The ATS does not purport to override the immunity of foreign
governments or officials. As noted above, the principal source of
immunity from civil suit in the United States for foreign govern
ments and officials is the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).92 The FSIA provides foreign states with presumptive im
munity from civil suit unless their conduct falls within one of the
statutory exceptions to immunity.93

Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.,94

In

Argentine Republic v.

the Supreme Court held that the

FSIA constitutes the exclusive basis for the exercise of jurisdiction
over a foreign state, even with respect to cases that otherwise would
satisfy the terms of the ATS.95
The FSIA does not refer to suits against individual officials of
foreign governments. Rather, it refers to suits against a "foreign
state,"96 which is defined to include "a political subdivision of a for
eign state or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state."97 The
FSIA's legislative history lists state corporations and agencies but
not individuals as examples of what is meant by the term "foreign
state."98 Numerous courts nonetheless have held that the FSIA ap
plies to individual officials acting in an official capacity.99 These
courts have reasoned that when foreign officials act within the
scope of their official duties, their acts are the state's acts and must
accordingly receive sovereign immunity.100

In addition, these

courts note that if individuals were not covered by the FSIA, plain28 u.s.c. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1994).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604.
94. 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
95. See 488 U.S. at 438.
96. See 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a). Agency or instrumentality is in tum defined as, among other
things, "any entity" that is "a separate legal person." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (emphasis added).
98. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 15-16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6613-14.
99. See, e.g., Junquist v. Nahyan, 115 F.3d 1020, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Phaneuf v. Repub
lic of Indonesia, 106 F.3d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1997); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75 F.3d
668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Chuidian v. Philippine Natl. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir.
1990); Trujillo v. Banco Cent. Del Ecuador, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1343-44 (S.D. Fla. 1998);
Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione Del Fallimento/lnterchange Bank, 928 F.
Supp. 241, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. De Gruyter, 822 F. Supp. 662, 674 (C.D. Cal.
1993); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); American Bonded Warehouse
Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 653 F. Supp. 861, 863 (N.D. III. 1987); Mueller v.
Diggelman, No. 82 Civ. 5513, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16970, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1983);
Rios v. Marshall, 530 F. Supp. 351, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). But see Republic of Philippines v.
Marcos, 665 F. Supp. 793, 797 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("[T]he sovereign immunity doctrine . . . is
not applicable to individual government officials.").
100. See, e.g., Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1101-02.
92.
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tiffs could render the statute ineffective simply by suing a state's
officials rather than the state itself.1 01
The FSIA's immunities for foreign states and officials are in ob
vious tension with the international human rights litigation found in
Filartiga and other decisions to be authorized by the ATS.102 And it
is clear from

Amerada Hess

that the F SIA takes precedence over

the AT S. To circumvent the immunity bar, plaintiffs in human
rights cases have invoked ambiguities in the FSIA in an effort to
persuade courts to recognize exceptions to immunity.1 03 In particu
lar, they have argued in various ways that the FSIA should be read
to permit an exception to immunity for gross violations of interna
tional human rights law.104 Such a construction of the FSIA ap
pears at first glance to be similar to the construction of the British
immunity statute adopted by the Law Lords in Pinochet. As a re
sult, plaintiffs in human rights cases are likely to invoke the

Pinochet
B.

precedent in their efforts to override FSIA immunities.

U.S. Rejection of the International Law Override Strategy

As we explain in this section, U.S. courts have rejected attempts
to create an international human rights law exception to the FSIA.
These courts have relied on both particular features of U.S. law as
well as broader constitutional principles. Given this reasoning, U.S.
courts are unlikely to embrace the logic of the Pinochet decision.

No general international law exception.

The FSIA contains no

general exception to immunity for violations of international law.
As enacted in 1976, the FSIA contained a single specific exception
relating to a violation of international law - an exception for cer
tain takings of property.105 In

Amerada Hess,

the Supreme Court

inferred from this exception that other violations of international
law do not constitute exceptions to immunity under the FSIA.106 In
a subsequent decision, the Court held that even torture - the con
duct at issue in Pinochet
can be sovereign conduct subject to the
presumptive immunity of the FSIA.1 01
-

101. See, e.g., Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1102.
102. See generally David J. Bederman, Dead Man's Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign
Immunities in U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INTL. L. 255 (1995/1996).
103. See infra text accompanying notes 105-29.
104. See infra text accompanying notes 108-14.
105. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1994).
106. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 435-36
(1989).
107. See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 361 (1993) (reasoning that "however mon
strous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a foreign state's exercise of the power of its police has
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Faced with a rejection of a gen

eral international law exception to immunity, plaintiffs and some
commentators have proposed an exception for fundamental, or ''jus
cogens, " norms of international human rights law. 108 As noted
above, a jus

cogens norm is

"accepted and recognized by the inter

national community of States as a whole as a norm from which no
derogation is permitted." 109 Although the FSIA contains no gen
eral exception to immunity for violations of international human
rights law, it does contain an exception to immunity for situations
where the foreign state "has waived its immunity either explicitly or
by implication. " 110 Plaintiffs and commentators have invoked this
exception to argue that foreign governments waive their immunity
by implication when they violate jus

cogens

norms of international

human rights law, such as the prohibitions on genocide, war crimes,
and torture.
The three federal appeals courts that have considered this argu
ment (or a variation of it) have rejected it. 111 These courts have
emphasized that the governing law is the domestic FSIA, not inter
cogens exception. 112

national law, and that the FSIA contains no jus

The most recent of these decisions noted that Congress amended
the FSIA after the earlier decisions but failed to enact any general

jus cogens

exception to the FSIA, thereby suggesting that "Con

gress is not necessarily averse to permitting some violations of jus
cogens to be redressed through channels other than suits against
long been understood for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in
nature").
108. For commentary to this effect, see, for example, Adam C. Belsky et al., Comment,
Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of
Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REv. 365 (1989), Thora A. Johnson, A
Violation of Jus Cogens Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity Under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Ac� 19 Mn. J. INTL. L. & TRADE 259 (1995). For examples of similar
plaintiffs' claims, see infra note 111.
109. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 52, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
334.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l).
111. See Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir.
1996); Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 714-19 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Sampsom v.
Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F. Supp. 1108, 1123 (N.D. III. 1997); Denegri v. Republic
of Chile, No. 86-3085, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4233, at *11-12 (D.D.C. April 3, 1992). See
generally Garland A. Kelly, Note, Does Customary International Law Supersede a Federal
Statute?, 37 CoLUM. J. TRANSNATL. L. 507 (1999) (describing and defending these decisions).
112. By contrast, one dissenting judge has argued that the FSIA should be interpreted
not to give more immunity in this context than is conferred under international law. See
Princz, 26 F.3d at 1176 (Wald, J., dissenting). That judge reasoned that "the clear import of
international law is to disavow a foreign sovereign's claims to immunity where that sovereign
is accused of violating universally accepted norms of conduct essential to the preservation of
the international order." 26 F.3d at 1183.
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foreign states in United States courts."113 The court also noted that
"Congress might well have expected the response to [allegations of
terrorism] to come from the political branches of the. Government,
which are not powerless to penalize a foreign state for international
terrorism."114 In short, courts have recognized that there are means
of redress for human rights abuses other than civil suits in U.S.
courts, and they have insisted that even the most fundamental
norms of international human rights law do not override domestic
immunities until Congress says so.

No international treaty exception.

Plaintiffs and scholars also

have attempted to override domestic immunities for international
human rights law violations by relying on the FSIA's treaty excep
tion. The FSIA's presumptive immunity is "[s]ubject to existing in
ternational agreements to which the United States [was] a party at
the time of [the FSIA's] enactment."115 The Supreme Court in

Amerada Hess interpreted this provision to apply only "when inter
national agreements 'expressly conflic[t]' with the immunity provi
sions of the FSIA."11 6 The Court further noted that a foreign
nation does not "waive its immunity . . . by signing an international
agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit
in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action
in the United States."117 A number of lower courts have con
cluded, following

Amerada Hess,

that a nation's ratification of a

human rights treaty does not constitute a waiver of the nation's im
munity from U.S. judicial process unless the treaty itself contains a
waiver or confers a private cause of action.118

No human rights exception to head-of-state immunity.

As we ex

plain in some detail in the next Part, both before and after the en
actment of the FSIA courts have looked to the political branches

for authorization to apply head-of-state immunity.11 9 Because the

FSIA does not by its terms refer to heads of state, most courts have
sought this authorization from the executive branch in the form of
113. Smith, 101 F.3d at 244.
114. Smith, 101 F.3d at 244.
115. 28 u.s.c. § 1604.
116. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442 (1989)
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6615-16
and S. REP. No. 94-1310, at 17 (1976)).
117. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. at 442-43.
118. See Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 719-20 (9th Cir. 1992); Saltany v.
Reagan, 886 F.2d 438, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 975 F.
Supp. 1108, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
119. See infra Part IV.A-B.
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executive suggestion.120 In so doing, courts have recognized

head-of-state immunity even in the face of alleged violations of in
ternational criminal and human rights law.121 The basis and scope
of former head of state immunity are less certain,122 but nothing in
-

-

-

the case law suggests a human rights exception to this immunity.123

The discretionary function anomaly.

Plaintiffs also have at

tempted to create an international law override to the FSIA
through its "non-commercial tort" exception, which denies immu
nity for torts that cause injury or damage in the United States.124
This exception in tum contains its own exception that preserves im
munity for claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function."125 Courts
are divided over whether illegal acts can be discretionary for these
purposes.126 Most important for now, however, is the district court
decision,
120.

Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 127

suggesting in this context

See infra text accompanying notes 184-87.

121. See, e.g., Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting
immunity to President Aristide of Haiti in a suit alleging violations of international human
rights law); Saltany v. Reagan, 702 F. Supp. 319, 320 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting immunity to
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in a suit alleging violations of international law relating to
her assistance with air strikes in Libya); Kilroy v. Wmdsor, No. C 78-291 (N.D. Ohio 1978),
excerpted in State Representation, 1978 DIGEST § 3, at 641-43 (granting immunity to the
Prince of Wales in a suit alleging that he was responsible for human rights violations in
Northern Ireland); see also Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 24 (D.D.C.
1998) (assuming that head-of-state immunity ordinarily would apply to "state sponsorship of
terrorism" because such conduct involves a "decision made at the highest levels of
government").
122. See generally Peter Evan Bass, Note, Ex-Head ofState Immunity: A Proposed Statu
tory Tool ofForeign Policy, 97 YALE L.J. 299 (1987).
123. Most former-head-of-state immunity claims have been resolved on the basis of
waiver. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45-46 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
817 F.2d 1108, 1110-11 (4th Cir. 1987); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 211 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
Some courts have suggested in dicta that former-head-of-state immunity does not extend to
private (as opposed to official) acts. See, e.g., In re Doe, 860 F.2d at 44 (dicta); Republic of
the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 360 (2d Cir. 1986) (dicta); United States v. Noriega,
746 F. Supp. 1506, 1519 n.11 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dicta); cf. Trajano v. Marcos, No. 86-0207, 1986
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22541, at *17 (D. Haw. July 18, 1986) (noting, in response to claim of
former-head-of-state immunity, that "[u]ntil such time as head of state immunity is made a
creature of judicial interpretation, this court will not intrude on the prerogative of the execu
tive branch to make such determinations"); Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1252 (Haw.
1998) (questioning, perhaps in dicta, the availability of immunity to former heads of state).

See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1994).
§ 1605(a)(5)(A). See generally Sienho Yee, Note, The Discretionary Function
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: When in America, Do the Romans
Do as the Romans Wish?, 93 CoLUM. L. REv. 744 (1993).
126. Courts holding that an illegal act can be discretionary include Risk v. Halvorsen, 936
F.2d 393, 397 (9th Cir. 1991); MacArthur Area Citizens Assn. v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d
918, 922 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Kline v. Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). By
contrast, in Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419, 1431 (9th Cir. 1989), the court held that
124.

125.

foreign officials did not have discretion to commit a clear violation of their own domestic law.
127. 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
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that there is no discretion to commit a clear violation of

tional law.128

interna

The court concluded that Chile's alleged involvement

in the assassination of former Chilean officials in the United States
was not discretionary because it was "clearly contrary to the
precepts of humanity as recognized in both national and interna
tional law. " 129

Letelier

is the only decision of which we are aware suggesting

that international law might abrogate immunity within the U.S. do
mestic legal system. Even if the

Letelier

decision correctly inter

preted the scope of the discretionary function exception, the
decision has limited significance to human rights litigation because
such litigation almost always involves human rights abuses commit
ted on foreign soil, while the noncommercial tort exception applies
only in situations where the injury or damage occurs in the· United
States. In any event, the

Letelier

analysis is difficult to reconcile

with the Supreme Court's later decision in
sistence of

Amerada Hess

Amerada Hess.

The in

and its progeny that the only interna

tional law-related exceptions to immunity under the FSIA must
appear on the face of the statute likely sounded the death knell for

Letelier's discretionary function analysis.
Individual Capacity Suits. Although the FSIA is generally appli
cable in human rights suits brought against foreign government offi
cials, 130 some courts have concluded that certain human rights suits
against individuals do not implicate the FSIA.131 These courts in
terpret the FSIA to extend immunity only to individuals acting in
an official capacity, and the courts look to foreign

law to

determine

whether the individuals accused of human rights abuses were so act
ing. If the alleged human rights abuses are not authorized under
the foreign official's domestic law, these courts conclude that the
abuses are beyond the official's scope of authority and thus outside
128. Coincidentally for purposes of this article, that case also involved alleged conduct by
Pinochet's government.
129. Letelier, 488 F. Supp. at 673; see also Alicog v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 860 F.
Supp. 379, 383 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (stating in dicta that "[k]idnapping, private imprisonment,
and assassination are all beyond the scope of legitimate diplomatic operations and are not
protected by the discretionary function exception, and courts have jurisdiction over a govern
ment committing those acts").
130. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
131. See Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir. 1994}; Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah,
921 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 174-76 (D.
Mass. 1995). This case law is not uniform; a number of courts have applied the FSIA to
individual officials who allegedly engaged in abusive and illegal conduct. See, e.g., Herbage v.
Meese, 747 F. Supp. 60, 67 (D.D.C. 1990) (alleged improper arrest and extradition); Kline v.
Kaneko, 685 F. Supp. 386, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (alleged expulsion from country without due
process).
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of the official immunities conferred by the FSIA. The absence of
immunity in these cases does not tum on the foreign official's viola
tion of international law. These cases thus do not represent an in
ternational law override of the FSIA.132

Congressional responses.

Human rights activists often have

complained to Congress regarding the limitations on human rights
litigation, including the restrictions imposed by domestic immunity
law. Congress's responses to these complaints have been limited
and targeted, further confirming that immunity should be available
even for human rights abuses unless and until Congress creates an
exception. For example, in response to concerns that international
human rights law might not provide a private right of action,133
Congress enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).134
This 1992 statute created a federal cause of action against foreign
officials who under color of state law commit torture or extrajudi
cial killings. Nothing on the face of the TVPA overrides the immu
nities of the FSIA, and the TVPA's legislative history makes clear
that the TVPA is "subject to restrictions in the [FSIA]. " 135 The leg132. Traditionally, the act of state doctrine might have precluded courts in individual ca
pacity cases from inquiring into the validity of foreign acts under foreign law. See Underhill
v. Hernandez, 168 U. S. 250, 252 (1897) ("[C]ourts of one country will not sit in judgment on
the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."). In Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398 (1964), however, the Supreme Court held that the act of
state doctrine is based on domestic separation of powers considerations rather than (as previ
ously been the case) international law. See 376 U. S. at 421-23. The Court expressed particu
lar concern that judicial inquiry into the validity of foreign government acts might interfere
with the executive branch's conduct of foreign relations. See 376 U.S.at 431-33. One conse
quence of this new conception of the act of state doctrine is that the doctrine is limited to the
official, public acts of a foreign government. Only an adjudication of those acts, courts have
reasoned, is likely to embarrass the executive branch in its conduct of foreign relations. See
Lynn E. Parseghian, Defining the "Public Act" Requirement in the Act ofState Doctrine, 58 U.
Cm.L. REv. 1151 (1991) (collecting cases). Invoking this limitation, some courts have con·
eluded that the adjudication of alleged human rights abuses not authorized by a foreign gov
ernment are not "public acts " and thus are not covered by the act of state doctrine. See, e.g.,
Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1471 (describing earlier decision); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 F.2d 1419,
1431-34 (9th Cir.1989); Forti v. Suarez- Mason, 672 F. Supp.1531, 1546 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
133. These concerns were fueled by Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren v.
(D.C. Cir. 1984), in which he argued that C IL does not
ordinarily confer a private right of action. See 726 F.2d at 816-19. For three recent decisions
refusing to imply a private right of action under international human rights law, see Heinrich
v. Sweet, 1999 U. S. Dist. LEX I S 6669 (
D. Mass. Apr. 30, 1999), Hawkins v. Comparat
Cassani, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1244 (C.D. Cal.1999) and White v. Paulsen, 997 F. Supp.1380 (E.D.
Wash. 1998). These courts noted the adequacy of domestic legal protections, the limited
nature of Congress's codification of international human rights law in the Torture Victim
Protection Act, see infra note 134, and the fact that the domestic enforcement of interna
tional human rights law is primarily the responsibility of Congress and the Executive rather
than the courts.

Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774

134. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (set forth in statutory note following Alien
Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C.§ 1350 (1994)).
135. H. R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88. The
Senate Report similarly states that the TVPA "is not meant to override the Foreign
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islative history further states that "nothing in the TVPA overrides
the doctrines of diplomatic and head of state immunity. "136 Simi
larly, other human rights and terrorism-related statutes, such as the
Genocide Convention Implementation Act137 and the Act for the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking,138 do
not purport to override immunities from suit.
There have been many calls in recent years for Congress to cre
ate exceptions to FSIA immunity for human rights abuses, and a
number of bills to this effect have been introduced in Congress.139
These efforts resulted in the enactment in 1996 of a very narrow
human rights exception to immunity. This new exception removes
immunity for torture, extrajudicial killing, and certain terrorist acts,
but only when committed by nations that have been deemed spon
sors of terrorism, and only in cases where the victim or claimant is a
U.S. national.140 Only seven nations - Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya,
North Korea, Sudan, and Syria - are currently deemed sponsors of
terrorism.141 Even in these limited circumstances, plaintiffs invok
ing the new exception face an exhaustion requirement, discovery
restrictions, and a statute of limitations.142 Against the background
of

Amerada Hess,

this narrow and precise exception to immunity

suggests that, in cases not covered by the exception, immunity re
mains available even with respect to egregious human rights abuses.
Sovereign Immunities Act . . . ." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7 (1991). The Senate Report also
states, however, that "[t]he legislation uses the term 'individual' to make crystal clear that
foreign states or their entities cannot be sued under this bill under any circumstances: only
individuals may be sued." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7. Because the courts had held long before
the TVPA that government officials acting in their official capacities come within the FSIA's
immunities, see supra text accompanying note 99, and since the legislative history makes clear
that the TVPA was not meant to override the FSIA, the reference to "individuals" presuma
bly means foreign officials acting in excess of their official capacities, for in this context the
FSIA has been interpreted not to confer immunity, see supra notes 130-32 and accompanying
text.
136. H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5; see also S. REP. No. 102-249, at 7-8 ("The TVPA is not
intended to override traditional diplomatic immunities . . . . Nor should visiting heads of
state be subject to suit under the TVPA.").
137. 18 u.s.c. § 1091 (1988).
138. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2186 (1984).
139. See Jeffrey Jacobson, Note, Trying To Fit a Square Peg into a Round Hole: The
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Human Rights Violations, 19 WHITTIER L. REv. 757,
773-75 (1998) (recounting these efforts).
140. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)
(Supp. ill 1997).
141. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). These nations are presently deemed to be state sponsors
of terrorism under 50 U.S.C. app. § 24050) (1994) and 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1994). See 22 C.F.R.
§ 126.l(d) (1998).
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i), (f), (g).
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In sum, U.S. courts generally have rejected efforts to circumvent
the availability of domestic immunity for foreign officials by refer
ence to international human rights law. Instead, they have treated
questions of immunity as controlled by domestic law, and they have
in a number of cases applied such immunity to alleged human rights
abuses. The limited and targeted congressional interventions in this
area only confirm the propriety of this approach.
C.

Back to

Pinochet

The U.S. practice with respect to domestic immunities in civil
suits alleging human rights abuses confirms that " [w]hether and
how the United States wishe[s] to react to [international law claims
raised in its domestic courts] are domestic questions."143 This point
has special force in the context of civil human rights litigation,
where the ideals of the underlying law clash with the exigencies of
international politics. The federal political branches have resolved
this tension largely, although not exclusively, in favor of immunities
for foreign sovereigns and officials, even for violations of the most
serious of international human rights law. Courts have deferred to
the political branches on this point, and, as a result, have refused to
countenance claims that international human rights law overrides
domestic immunities.
The U.S. approach to the relationship between domestic human
rights litigation and international immunities differs from the
British approach in Pinochet. As noted above, these differences are
explained in part by differences in domestic law. Even at a broader
level, however, the

Pinochet

case is not inconsistent with the U.S.

approach. As several Law Lords acknowledged, there are impor
tant functional differences between immunity in the criminal extra
dition context and immunity in the context of civil litigation.144
Whether in the civil or criminal context, one nation's examination
of the validity of another nation's human rights record directly im
plicates international relations. In the criminal extradition or pros
ecution context, however, the executive branch has the duty,
expertise, and discretion to accommodate such foreign relations
143. Hilao v.
omitted).

Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 {9th Cir. 1994) (internal citations and quotations

144. As Lord Millett noted, there is "nothing illogical or contrary to public policy in de
nying the victims of state sponsored torture the right to sue the offending state in a foreign
court while at the same time permitting {and indeed requiring) other states to convict or
punish the individuals responsible if the offending state declines to take action." Second Law
Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 914 (H.L.) (Lord Millett); see also [1999] 2 W.L.R. at
892, 899 {Lord Hutton), 916 (Lord Phillips).
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concerns. By contrast, civil human rights litigation is under the con
trol of private plaintiffs, many of whom are noncitizens, and
unelected judges. In this context, a broader and more rule-like ap
proach to immunity doctrine makes sense. Otherwise U.S. foreign
relations decision-making would in effect be delegated to foreign
human rights victims and federal courts. However noble the aims
of international human rights litigation, these actors are not well
suited to assess U.S. foreign relations interests.14s

In this regard, it is worth recalling that the Law Lords expressly
encouraged Britain's Home Secretary to reconsider his decision to
allow extradition proceedings against Pinochet to go forward, even
though the Law Lords had determined that there was a valid legal
basis to proceed with extradition. In other words, they understood
that their decision would not be the final word on Pinochet's extra
dition, and they believed that, even if the case for extradition were
legally sufficient, it might be outweighed by political considerations.
The Home Secretary ultimately ruled that the extradition should
proceed. His decision, however, was based on just the sort of bal
ancing of legal and political considerations-including the likely ef
fect of extradition on Great Britain's relations with Chile and on
Chile's internal stability-that is not available in private civil litiga
tion.146 Because of the unavailability of such a balancing process, it
is not surprising that the political branches would impose stricter
limits in this context on the extent to which international human
rights law developments can override domestic immunities.147

IV.

HEAD-OF-STATE lMMuNITY AND THE DOMESTIC STATUS OF
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Law Lords' use of international law to limit domestic im
munities is not the only way in which the

Pinochet decision is rele

vant to international human rights litigation in U.S. courts. It also
is relevant to the claim, often made in this litigation, that CIL is
self-executing federal common law, to be "applied by courts in the
United States without any need for it to be enacted or implemented

145. It is important to keep in mind that the United States is unique in the extent to
which it permits civil international human rights litigation between foreign parties. See
Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Ftlartiga: Litigating Human Rights Claims
Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 YALE J. !NTI.. L. 65, 101 (1995); Beth Stephens,
Litigating Customary International Human Rights Norms, 25 GA. J. !NTI.. & CoMP. L. 191,
200 (1996).
146. See supra text accompanying note 44.
147. In Part V, we discuss more generally the United States' resistance to the incorpora
tion of international human rights law into the U.S. legal system.

Michigan Law Review

2160

[Vol.

97:2129

by Congress."148 This claim, which we have termed the "modern
position," 149 has been central to the success of human rights litiga
tion in U.S. courts because it allows for the judicial incorporation of
international human rights law without the need for express polit
ical branch approval. At first glance, the modern position resem
bles the British rule, referred to by some of the Law Lords in

Pinochet,

that the law of nations is incorporated into the domestic

common law.150 In addition, proponents of the modern position
have invoked the example of head-of-state immunity, which was at
issue in

Pinochet,

as a particularly compelling confirmation of the

modem position.
We have extensively critiqued the modern position in other
writings.151 In this Part, we use the head-of-state immunity exam
ple to further develop our critique. As we explain, U.S. courts his
torically did apply something akin to the British rule of automatic
incorporation of CIL, but that regime did not survive

Tompkins.152

Instead, courts after

Erie

Erie

v.

have applied CIL rules, in

cluding CIL rules of immunity, only when and to the extent they
believe they are authorized to do so by the federal political
branches. The failure of courts to embrace the modem position in
the immunity context, where it would seem to be most justified,
casts substantial doubt on the claim that it allows for the judicial
incorporation of international human rights law. As a result, in
stead of confirming the modern position, as its proponents have
maintained, the example of head-of-state immunity actually weak
ens the case for it.

148. Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555,
1561 (1984) [hereinafter International Law as Law].
149. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modem Position, 110 HARv. L. REv. 815, 815 (1997) [here
inafter A Critique]. As we have explained, the modem position is appropriately described as
"modem" because it was embraced in a judicial decision for the first time in 1980, see
Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980), and has risen to academic orthodoxy
only since that decision, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra, at 831-37.
150. See Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. at 912 (Lord Millett) ("Customary
international law is part of the common law . . . .") ; Heathfield v. Chilton, 98 Eng. Rep. 50, 50
(K.B. 1767); 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *67. The "law of nations" is the
traditional term for customary international law.

151. See Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique, supra note 149; Bradley & Goldsmith, The
Current Illegitimacy, supra note 88; Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts
and the Incorporation ofInternational Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2260 (1998) [hereinafter Fed
eral Courts].
152. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Head-of-State Immunity and Erie

To understand the significance of the head-of-state immunity
practice for the modem position debate, it is important first to un
derstand how U.S. courts traditionally applied CIL rules of immu
nity, and how

Erie v. Tompkins

altered this practice. For most of

our nation's history, head-of-state immunity was viewed as a com
ponent of foreign sovereign immunity.1 53 Prior to Erie, federal and
state courts alike applied the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity on
the domestic plane without authorization from Congress or the Ex
ecutive. Thus, for example, in the 1812

Schooner Exchange

deci

sion, the Supreme Court applied the CIL of sovereign immunity
without bothering to consider domestic authorization to do so. 1 54
Similarly, in

Hatch v.

Baez, 1 55 a New York court relied on an Eng

lish precedent but no domestic authorization in holding that the for
mer President of the Dominican Republic was entitled to immunity
for his official acts.
In these and other cases, state and federal courts applied CIL
immunities as part of the "general" common law most famously as
sociated with

Swift v. Tyson.156

As a form of general common law,

the CIL immunities were available as a source of law in domestic
litigation. But this CIL did not have the status of federal law and
thus had few implications beyond its use in particular decisions.
State courts were not bound by federal court determinations of the
content of this CIL or the procedures by which it was identified. 1 57
The Supreme Court could not review state court interpretations of
the CIL of international immunity because such interpretations
were not matters of federal law. 1 58 And, although state and federal
courts were bound by the Executive's determination of whether to
recognize a foreign government, they interpreted the CIL of inter153. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812); REsTATE·
66 (1965); Peter D. Trooboff, Foreign State
Immunity: Emerging Consensus on Principles, 200 RECUEIL DES CoURS 235, 252 (1986 V).
154. See Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 147.
155. 14 N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596, 600 (1876).
156. 41 U.S. (16 Pet) 1 (1842).
157. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign
Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 27-28 (1999); see also QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 161 (1922) (noting that a "state constitution or legislative
MENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §

provision in violation of customary international law is valid unless in conflict with a Federal
constitutional provision or an act of Congress").

158. See Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Republic, 266 U.S. 580, 580 (1924);
Oliver American Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); New York Life Ins. Co.
v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875).
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national immunity independent of the views of the executive
branch.159
During the pre

Erie

-

period, then, U.S. courts, in applying CIL

rules of immunity, followed something akin to the British automatic
incorporation rule.

Erie's

abrogation of general common law, and

its insistence that all law applied by federal courts be grounded in
the Constitution or a federal enactment, called this practice into
question. Proponents of the modern position assert that after

Erie,

the automatic incorporation rule continued but that CIL assumed
the status of self-executing federal common law rather than general
common law.160 If this assertion were correct, one would expect to
see courts embracing the modern position in the many international
immunity cases decided in the years following

Erie. But that is not
Erie, the Supreme

what happened. Instead, around the time of
Court

stopped

applying the CIL of immunity on its own authority,

as it had done under the general common law regime, and began to
justify its application on the basis of executive branch authoriza
tion.161 The law so applied was, to be sure, federal law. It was fed
eral law by virtue of a political-branch authorization, however, and
not an independent judicial power to incorporate CIL.
The trend away from the automatic incorporation of CIL immu
nity principles as nonfederal law to the authorized application of
these principles as federal law began the year Erie was decided. In
The Navemar, 162 decided just three months before Erie and issued
the day Erie was argued, the Court intimated for the first time that
courts were bound by executive suggestions of immunity.163 Subse
quently, in its 1943

Ex parte Republic ofPeru164 decision, the Court

squarely held that, because immunity determinations implicated im159. See, e.g., Berizzi Bros. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (granting immunity
even though State Department had argued in the lower court that immunity should not be
granted); see also White, supra note 157, at 134.
160. See, e.g., Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 148, at 1561; Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1824, 1831-33 (1998) [here
inafter State Law].
161. As noted in the House Report accompanying the enactment of the FSIA, "In the
early part of this century, the Supreme Court began to place less emphasis on whether immu
nity was supported by the law and practice of nations, and relied instead on the practices and
policies of the State Department." H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 8 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606.
162. Compania Espanola de Navigacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68
(1938) [hereinafter The Navemar].
163. The Court stated that, upon receipt of a suggestion of immunity from the executive
branch, it was the "duty" of the courts to grant immunity. See The Navemar, 303 U.S. at 74.
For a discussion of how The Navemar constituted a break from prior practice, see White,
supra note 157, at 134-41.
164. 318 U.S. 578 (1943).
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portant foreign relations interests, courts were bound to follow ex
ecutive suggestions of immunity.165 Two years later, in

Republic of

Mexico v. Hoffman, 166

the Court went further, stating that even in
the face of executive-branch silence, U.S. courts should look to "the
principles accepted by the [executive branch]."167 As a result, the
Court explained that "[i]t is . . . not for the courts to deny an immu
nity which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an im
munity on new grounds which the government has not seen fit to
recognize."168 These Supreme Court decisions formed the basis for
the lower courts' consistent post-Erie, pre-FSIA practice of relying
on executive branch guidance and principles to justify the domestic
application of sovereign immunity.169
The Supreme Court never expressly tied its shift in treatment of
foreign sovereign immunity doctrines to

Erie. But the shift took
Erie, and it is easy to un
Before Erie, the automatic applica

place at approximately the same time as
derstand why

Erie was pivotal.

tion of CIL as general common law had relatively few constitutional
implications: it did not supersede state law or affect state court
practice; it did not create a new basis for federal jurisdiction; and it
did not bind the Executive. Once Erie eliminated this form of law
in our constitutional system, however, federal courts could apply
CIL on their own authority only as federal common law, with more
serious constitutional consequences.
165.

If CIL were self-executing

See 318 U.S. at 588-89.

166. 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
167.

Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35.
169. See, e.g., Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1200 (2d Cir.
168.

1971); Heaney v. Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971); Victory Transport, Inc. v. Comisaria
General de Abastecimientos y 'Ii:ansportes, 336 F.2d 354, 358-59 (2d Cir. 1964). See generally
Monroe Leigh, Sovereign Immunity - The Case of the "Imias," 68 AM. J. INTL. L. 280, 281
(1974); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sovereign Immunity Claim - The Haiti Case, 49
N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 377, 389-90 (1974). Tue lower courts deferred to the Executive even when its
suggestions were not consistent with CIL. See Leigh, supra, at 281 (citing Rich v. Naviera
Vacuba, S.A., 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961) and Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Venezuela,
215 A.2d 864 (1966)). In cases in which the Executive made no suggestion of immunity,
several courts stated that the matter was for "judicial determination." See, e.g., Flota
Maritima Browning de Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad de la Habana, 335 F.2d 619, 623 (4th
Cir. 1964); National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 420 F. Supp. 954, 956
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281, 1282-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Anaconda Co. v. Corporacion del Cobre, 55 F.R.D. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). But these
determinations were always guided by the State Department's policies as articulated in the
Tate letter, see infra note 174 and accompanying text, and "several cases . . . used the State
Department's failure to intercede after being asked to do so as one basis for denial of immu
nity," Lowenfeld, supra, at 390. See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480, 487-89 (1983) (noting that when foreign nations did not seek immunity from the execu
tive branch, "the responsibility fell to the courts to determine whether sovereign immunity
existed, generally by reference to prior State Department decisions").
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U.S . federal common law, then it would provide a basis for "arising
under" federal jurisdiction under Article III, supersede inconsistent
state law under Article VI, and might bind the President under
Article II's "take care" clause.17° Especially in the absence of any
apparent constitutional authorization for the federalization of CIL,
it is not surprising that courts would seek political-branch authori·
zation before embracing these changes in the domestic significance
of CIL. As we have just seen, this is precisely what happened in the
immunity context.111
This posture was especially appropriate because, at the time of

Erie,

the CIL of immunity was in the midst of a transformation that

rendered it less amenable to independent judicial determination.
During the nineteenth century, the United States, like many other
countries, adhered to the "absolute" theory of sovereign immunity,
under which foreign governments were entitled to immunity for es·
sentially all of their acts, even those that were purely commercial in
nature.172 In the early twentieth century, however, a number of
countries began embracing the "restrictive" theory, under which
foreign governments were entitled to immunity for their public or
sovereign acts, but not for their private or commercial acts.173 This
shift to the restrictive theory, formally endorsed by the U.S. State
Department in 1952,174 made the CIL of immunity much more com
plex and difficult to apply.175 It also meant that foreign sovereigns
170. For a discussion of these implications, see Bradley & Goldsmith,
note 149, at 838-48.

A Critique, supra

171. A similar shift took place in the context of the act of state doctrine. This doctrine
traditionally was justified by reference to the international law principle of sovereign equal·
ity. See supra note 132. As we have just seen, however, Erie rendered problematic the auto
matic incorporation of international law doctrines. It is thus no surprise that, at about the
time of Erie, the Supreme Court began to reconceptualize the doctrine increasingly in do·
mestic law terms. In both United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328-30 (1937) and United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-33 (1942), the Court grounded the doctrine not only in
sovereign equality but also in the federal government's, especially the Executive's, broad
power over foreign affairs. This reconceptualization culminated in Sabbatino, where the
Supreme Court eschewed the international law basis for the doctrine altogether, justifying it
solely in terms of separation of powers. By grounding the doctrine in such " 'constitutional'
underpinnings," Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964), the Court
provided a basis for concluding that there was domestic authorization to treat the doctrine as
federal common law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, A Critique, supra note 149, at 859-61.
172. See GAMAL MoURSI BADR, STATE IMMuNITY: AN .ANALYTICAL AND PROGNOSTIC
Vmw 9-20 (1984) (outlining the pre-20th century history of the doctrine in the United
States).
173.

See id. at 21-62 (describing the transition from absolute to restrictive immunity).

174. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Attorney General (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEPI'. ST. BuLL. 984, 984-85 (1952).
175. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign States - A Proposal for Reform
of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 901, 906-09 (1969); Lowenfeld, Litigating a Sover·
eign Immunity Claim, supra note 169, at 384.

Pinochet

June 1999)

2165

would be hailed into court more often, thereby heightening the for
eign policy stakes associated with immunity determinations.176 In
this environment, it made sense that unelected judges with no for
eign relations expertise would seek political-branch guidance on
whether and how to apply foreign sovereign immunity.111

B.

Modern Practice

It does not follow from the above analysis that case-by-case ex
ecutive-branch authorization is the optimal process for the domestic
incorporation of international immunities. This process was, among
other things, politicized and unpredictable,178 and dissatisfaction
with it eventually led Congress in 1976 to enact the FSIA.179 In
effect, the FSIA transferred the political branch authorization for
judicial application of foreign sovereign immunity from executive
suggestion to congressional statute. The FSIA does not specify
whether its immunities extend to heads of state, either current or
former.18° The FSIA defines "foreign state" to include a "political
subdivision" or an "agency or instrumentality" of a foreign state,181
but neither the statute nor its legislative history mentions head-of
state immunity.182
This silence raises the question of whether a foreign head of
state is entitled to immunity in U.S. courts after the FSIA, and if so,
176. The Supreme Court had acknowledged the foreign policy implications of exposing
foreign sovereigns to suit in Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1945).
177. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpre
tive Theory, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1785 (1997) (giving general theoretical account of why judges
seek political branch authorization when judicial practices become political or controversial).
178. See Lowenfeld, supra note 175, at 909, 913; Frederic Alan Weber, The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976: Its Origin, Meaning and Effect, 3 YALE STUD. Woru.;o
PUB. ORD. 1, 11-13, 15-17 (1976).
179. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486-89 (1983); GARY B.
BoRN, !NTERNATIONAL Cxvn. LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES CoURTS 210-11 (3d ed. 1996).
180. Mark Feldman, a participant in the drafting of the FSIA, explained the statute's
silence on the head-of-state immunity issue as follows: "Frankly, we forgot about it [head-of
state immunity), or didn't know enough about it at the time, during those two or three critical
years when the statute was being formulated." Panel, Foreign Governments in United States
Courts, 85 AM. SoCY. lNn.. L. PRoc. 251, 276 (1991) (remarks of Mark Feldman during panel
discussion). By contrast, the sovereign immunity statutes in a number of other countries,
including Australia, Canada, and of course Britain, expressly refer to head-of-state immunity.
See Foreign States !=unities Act 1985, No. 196, chs. 3(3)(b), 36 (1985) (Austr.), reprinted in
25 I.L.M. 715; Act to Provide for State !=unity in Canadian Courts, 1982, R.S.C., ch. 95
(1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 798; State !=unity Act 1978, ch. 33 (1978) (Eng.), reprinted in
17 I.L.M. 1123.
181. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994). The FSIA's definition of "agency or instrumentality"
does not appear to encompass natural persons, since it refers to "any entity
which is a
separate legal person, corporate or otherwise." § 1603(b) (emphasis added).
182. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Note, Resolving the Confusion Over Head ofState Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 169, 174 (1986).
.
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on what basis. If the modem position were correct, the basis would
be easy to find: head-of-state immunity, as part of CIL, would ap
ply automatically as federal common law, notwithstanding the ab
sence of political branch authorization. In fact, however, of the
many decisions in which courts have considered and applied head
of-state immunity since enactment of the FSIA, not a single one has
applied head-of-state immunity as self-executing CIL. To the con
trary, consistent with the post-Erie requirement that all federal
common law be authorized by the Constitution or enacted federal
law, these courts continue to seek authorization from the political
branches to apply head-of-state immunity.
Some courts, for example, view the FSIA as providing for head
of-state immunity, even though the text of the statute is silent on
the issue.183 Other courts view the FSIA as inapplicable to a head
of state and instead look to executive branch authorization to apply
the doctrine.184

Among the courts that seek executive branch

authorization, some recognize head-of-state immunity only in the
face of an explicit suggestion of immunity by the Executive.185
Others rely on the lack of an executive branch suggestion simply as
a factor weighing against immunity.186 Importantly, in all of these
cases, courts ground head-of-state immunity in a federal political

branch authorization.187

Contrary to the modem position, courts in

183. See, e.g., O'Hair v. Wojtyla, No. 79-2463 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 1979), excerpted in State
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 1979 DIGEST § 7, at 897. More gener
ally, a number of courts have construed the FSIA to confer immunity on individual officials.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); Kilroy v. Wmdsor, No. C78-291 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 7, 1978), excerpted in State Representation, 1978 DIGEST § 3, at 641-43.
185.

See, e.g., Jungquist v. Nahyan, 940 F. Supp. 312, 321 (D.D.C. 1996).
See, e.g., First American Corp. v. Al-Nahyan, 948 F. Supp. 1107, 1121 (D.D.C. 1996);
cf Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1212 (inferring absence of immunity for Manuel Noriega from execu
tive branch's enforcement action against Noriega in Panama). Estate ofDomingo v. Marcos
provides a good illustration of the extent of executive control in this area. See Estate of
Domingo v. Marcos, No. C82-1055-V (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 1982), excerpted in State Terri
186.

tory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST 1981-1988 § 7, at
1564-66 (1995). The court initially granted immunity to Ferdinand Marcos based on an exec
utive suggestion. Subsequently, the Executive changed its position and suggested a denial of
immunity, and the court then followed that suggestion. See Estate of Domingo, No. C821055-V, in 2 CUMULATIVE DIGEST, supra, at 1568-69. Compare Estate of Doiningo v. Repub
lic of the Philippines, 694 F. Supp. 782, 786 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (denying immunity to Marcos
and noting that "although the State Department filed a suggestion of immunity when Marcos
was president, it has not filed a new suggestion of immunity") with Psinakis v. Marcos, No.
C75-1725-RHS (N.D. Cal. 1975), excerpted in State Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional
Immunities, 1975 DIGEST § 7, at 344-45 (honoring a suggestion of immunity for then-Presi
dent Marcos).
187. But cf In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 45 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating in dicta that "(w]hen lacking
guidance from the executive branch, as here, a court is left to decide for itself whether a
head-of-state is or is not entitled to immunity").
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this context do not assume that the CIL of head-of-state immunity
applies as self-executing federal common law.
C.

Significance for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts

This account of the way in which courts have treated head-of
state immunity has important implications for the broader debate
over the legitimacy of the modem position and, as a result, over the
legitimacy of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts.
The modem position has been central to this litigation for two rea
sons. The first is a technical but important jurisdictional point. The
typical international human rights lawsuit involves a foreign plain
tiff suing a foreign official in U.S. court for human rights abuses that
took place on foreign soil. The plaintiff usually sues under the AT S,
which, as noted above, states that the federal district courts shall
have jurisdiction over any civil action "by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."188 The Article III basis for alien-versus-alien
human rights cases is uncertain, however, because the parties are
not diverse,189 and the plaintiffs do not (for reasons explained be
low) seek relief under a treaty.190 Here is where the modem posi
tion comes in, because if CIL is federal common law, then AT S
suits can plausibly be viewed as "arising under" federal faw for pur
poses of Article III. This indeed was the holding of the Filartiga
decision that initiated the modern human rights litigation
movement.191
The second reason the modem position is important to human
rights litigation concerns substantive law. Most of the principles of
international human rights law invoked in domestic litigation are
contained in multilateral treaties.192 U.S. courts cannot apply these
treaties, however, for two reasons. First, the United States has
failed to ratify a number of them.193 Second, when the United
188. 28

u.s.c.

§ 1350 (1994).

189. The Supreme Court has long held that alien-versus-alien suits do not fall within Arti
cle Ill's diversity clause. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303, 304 (1809).
190. Article III includes within its categories of federal judicial power "Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under . . . Treaties." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
191.

See Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).

192. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, lNrERNATIONAL LAw: PoLmcs AND VALUES 36 (1995)
[hereinafter PoLmcs AND VALUES]; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection
of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 12 (1982).
193. For example, the United States has not ratified either the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, B.T.S. 44 (1992), cm. 1976 (Eng.), 28 I.L.M. 1448, or the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
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States has ratified human rights treaties, it has insisted, through a
series of reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUDs),
that the treaties cannot be used as a source of law in domestic litiga
tion.194 The modern position provides a way for courts to apply the
norms in these treaties as domestic law despite this political branch
resistance because, through a process that remains obscure and con
troversial, human rights treaties are viewed as giving rise to an inde
pendently valid CIL of human rights.195

Under the modern

position, this treaty-derived CIL can be applied as domestic law in
human rights cases even though the treaties themselves cannot be
applied domestically either because of lack of ratification or be
cause of the RUDs. In this way, the modern position "compen
sate[s] for the abstinence of the United States
of international human rights treaties. "196

vis-a-vis

ratification

Some of the problems with the modern position are apparent
from this description of the relationship between the CIL of human
rights and human rights treaties.197 It is generally accepted that
federal common law must be authorized in some fashion by the
Constitution or federal statute, and that federal common law is de
fined and limited by the actions of the federal political branches.198
As a result, it seems illegitimate for federal courts to apply as do
mestic law a CIL of human rights based almost exclusively on
human rights treaties that the political branches have taken pains to
ensure do not apply as domestic law. Such a federal common law
seems especially inappropriate because other federal enactments
194. See generally Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The
Ghost ofSenator Bricker, 89 AM J. INn.. L. 341 (1995) (hereinafter Ghost ofSenator Bricker];
David P. Stewart, United States Ratification ofthe Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The
Significance of the Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations, 42 DEPAUL L. RE.v. 1183
(1993).
195. For endorsements of this process, see HENKIN, POLITICS AND VALUES, supra note
192, at 37-44; Richard B. Lillich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J,
lNn.. L. 851, 856-58 (1989); Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the
Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. Rav. 1, 12 (1982). For criticism, see
Simma & Alston, supra note 67; J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the
Development of Human Rights Norms in International Law, 1979 U. ILL. LEGAL F. 609.
196. Simma & Alston, supra note 67, at 87; see also Lillich, supra note 195, at 856-57
(making a similar point); Bradley & Goldsmith, Federal Courts, supra note 151 (same).
197. For a more comprehensive analysis of these problems, see Bradley & Goldsmith, A
Critique, supra note 149.
198. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring) ("(F]ederal common law implements the Federal Constitution and
statutes, and is conditioned by them."); Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to
be applied in any case is the law of the State."). See generally Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking
Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. Rav. 263, 286-88 (1992).
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indicate political branch resistance to a wholesale federal incorpo
ration of international human rights.199
When attempting to justify the modem position, its proponents
tend not to address these separation of powers objections to the
automatic judicial incorporation of CIL. They concentrate instead
on federalism objections, which they dismiss because of a purported
need for national uniformity in foreign affairs. In addition, they
avoid emphasizing international human rights law issues, such as
the death penalty, because such issues implicate traditional state
prerogatives and thus are difficult to justify as an exclusive federal
concern. They instead point to traditional CIL governing relations
between nations, whicp. appears to trigger an exclusive federal pre
rogative and thus seems easier to justify as an exercise of federal
common law. In particular, recent defenses of the modem position
have rested heavily on the example of the CIL of immunity.
Consider, for example, Harold Koh's recent defense of the mod
em position.20° Koh reasoned that if CIL did not apply automati
cally as domestic federal law, "Massachusetts [could] deny the
customary international law protection of head-of-state immunity
to Queen Elizabeth on tort claims arising out of events in Northern
Ireland, whereas the forty-nine other states could choose instead to
grant the Queen every conceivable variant of full or partial immu
nity. "201 Koh similarly suggested that rejection of the modem posi
tion would mean that "federal judges sitting in New York diversity
actions filed against Imelda Marcos, Lee Teng-hui, Benjamin
Netanyahu, Yasser Arafat, or Pope John Paul II would have to
guess whether the New York Court of Appeals would accord each
or all of these defendants head-of-state immunity. "202 Koh con
cluded from these examples that it is "radical" and "bizarre" to
question the proposition that CIL has the status of federal law.203
Two points are worth noting regarding Koh's use of the head-of
state immunity example to justify the modem position. First, the
example is misleading to the extent that it suggests that the modem
position is necessary in order to ensure state compliance with tradi
tional CIL. In fact, the modem position is not needed for this pur
pose because the political branches have already codified by treaty
199. See supra text accompanying notes 133-42. For further discussion, see infra Part V.
200. See Koh, State Law, supra note 160; see also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel
Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. REv. 623 (1998).
201. Koh, State Law, supra note 160, at 1829.
202. Id. at 1850.
203. See id. at 1828, 1850.
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or statute almost all of the traditional CIL that is relevant to domes
tic litigation, rendering traditional CIL practically irrelevant as a
rule of decision or defense in domestic litigation. Head-of-state im
munity is a truly exceptional example of a traditional CIL norm
potentially relevant to domestic litigation that is not expressly codi
fied in enacted federal law.204
Second, and more importantly, courts apply head-of-state immu
nity in a fashion that is inconsistent with the modern position. They
ground the application of head-of-state immunity in authorization
by the political branches, usually the Executive. Modern position
proponents invoke the head-of-state immunity example because it
is a traditional rule of CIL that directly implicates relations with
foreign nations and thus presents the best possible context in which
to justify the modern position. But courts do not, in fact, embrace
the modern position even in this most favorable of contexts. In
stead, they seek political-branch authorization to apply CIL, and
they take care to ensure that the law so applied conforms to the
policies of the political branches. To return to one of Koh's exam
ples, rejection of the modern position does not mean that courts
would deny head-of-state immunity protection to the Queen of
England. It simply means that they would not confer such immu
nity directly under CIL, but rather would do so in accordance with
the wishes of the executive branch, which has the lead role in con
ducting U.S. foreign policy with England.
This practice has important implications for the claim that a

of human rights applies

CIL

as domestic federal law even in the absence

of political-branch authorization. The CIL of human rights is more
difficult to defend than traditional CIL as an area of federal com
mon law. Unlike traditional CIL, the CIL of human rights overlaps
substantially with traditional state prerogatives and thus should be
federalized, if at all, only by the democratically elected federal
political branches where state interests are represented.205 More204. Gerald Neuman contends that another such example is consular immunity. See
Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to
Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FoRDHAM L. RE.v. 371, 377 n.37, 382, 391 {1997). CIL
rules governing consular immunity, however, have been codified in the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, a multilateral treaty
that has been ratified by most nations of the world, including the United States. See United
Nations, United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties deposited with the Secretary
General, Chapter 3 (visited June 14, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Deptsffreaty> (registration re
quired) (reporting that 163 nations had ratified this treaty as of June 1999). Since the U.S.
ratification of the Convention in 1969, there has not been a single case in U.S. courts involv
ing the CIL of consular immunity.
205. See Thomas Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L.
RE.v. l, 17 {1985) (explaining why "[f]ederal courts . . . should not promulgate federal com-
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over, the political branches have affirmatively resisted the whole
sale judicial incorporation of the CIL of human rights.206 As a
result, the modem position seems especially questionable in the
context in which it most matters - international human rights
litigation.
The questionable basis for the modem position in the human
rights context presents a puzzle. Why would courts embrace the
modem position in the substantive human rights law context but
not in the head-of-state immunity context, given that the justifica
tions for the practice seem weaker in the former? The puzzle is
solved when one sees that, contrary to academic assertions and ju
dicial dicta, courts for the most part have

not embraced the modem

position with respect to the CIL of human rights.
The decisions that come closest to embracing the proposition
that a CIL of human rights applies as self-executing federal com
mon law are in human rights cases litigated under the ATS. The
watershed case,

Filartiga, definitely relied on this proposition in up
holding the constitutionality of the ATS.207 While later cases often

repeat this proposition in dicta, they tend to apply a CIL of human
rights in a fashion that is consistent with the political-branch au
thorization requirement. For example, in the large majority of suc
cessful international human rights cases, courts hold that Congress
in the ATS created a domestic federal cause of action for violations
of the CIL of human rights.208

Less often, courts hold that

Congress in the ATS authorized courts to develop a CIL of federal
common law.209 Some commentators have challenged these inter
pretations of the ATS.210 The pertinent point for now, however, is
that, rightly or wrongly as a matter of statutory interpretation,
courts view the ATS as having authorized the incorporation of CIL
into domestic law.
mon law rules that intrude upon [the traditional domain of the states] unless they have been
authorized to do so by an enacting body in which the states are represented").
206. See supra text accompanying notes 133·42, 194; see also infra Part V.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 91, 189-91.
208. See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Trajano v. Marcos, 978
F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1991); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179-84 (D. Mass. 1995);
Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207, 212 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531,
1539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
209. See Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
210. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy, supra note 88, at 358-63;
Alfred P. Rubin, U.S. Tort Suits by Aliens Based on International Law, INrL. PRAc.
NOTEBOOK, Jan. 1983, at 19, 20-23; Sweeney, supra note 88; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 811-16 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
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Further evidence that courts do not view CIL as federal com
mon law beyond the extent authorized by Congress can be found in
judicial resistance to applying a CIL of human rights to domestic
officials. If the modern position were correct, courts should apply
the ostensible CIL of human rights, like other federal law, to do
mestic officials. But federal courts do not in fact do so. They defer
to congressional statutes that violate customary international
human rights law.211 They generally do not apply customary inter
national human rights law to limit executive action.212 In addition,
although there is a widespread academic consensus that the CIL of
human rights should override inconsistent state law under the
supremacy clause,213 U.S. courts have never applied CIL in this
fashion, and they show no inclination to do so.
V.

WHY RESIST THE D OMESTIC INCORPORATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW?

We have argued in this article that the federal political branches
have, with limited exceptions, taken steps to limit international
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. In particular, they have
granted foreign states and their officials broad immunities from suit
and they have largely resisted the domestic incorporation of sub
stantive international human rights law. We have further argued
that courts should be, and generally have been, faithful to these
political branch actions. Why have our elected officials resisted the
incorporation of international human rights law into civil litigation?
And why do we maintain that federal courts in such litigation
should not play an independent role in the incorporation of interna
tional human rights norms?
Our answer to these questions is not based on skepticism re
garding either the aims of international human rights law or the
legitimacy of international law generally. It is instead based on the
view that the use of domestic civil litigation to enforce international
human rights law raises a number of serious problems for which the
211. See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Yunis,
924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir.
1986).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-70 (1992); Gisbert v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446,
1453-54 (11th Cir. 1986). But see Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 795, 798 (D. Kan.
1980).
213. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of
International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REv. 295; Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note
148.
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federal political branches are and should be constitutionally respon
sible. Those who argue for an open-ended incorporation of interna
tional human rights law into domestic civil litigation tend to
overlook or discount these problems. In this Part, we consider
these problems in two contexts: the application of international
human rights law against domestic officials and human rights law
suits against foreign governmental officials. We conclude by noting
several ways in which the Pinochet decision provides support for
the United States' general resistance to incorporating international
human rights norms into its domestic civil litigation system.

A.

Domestic Officials

The federal political branches have taken significant steps to en
sure that international human rights law cannot be applied in civil
litigation against U.S. officials. The RUDs attached to the U.S. rati
fication of human rights treaties render the treaties unenforceable
as domestic law.214 On the rare occasion when the political
branches authorize the application of international human rights
norms in civil litigation, they do so only with respect to foreign offi
cials, not domestic officials.215 The political branches have applied
international human rights norms to domestic officials for genocide
and war crimes, but these prohibitions can be enforced only by the
Executive.216 Finally, although the modem position contemplates
that CIL should be enforceable as federal law against domestic offi
cials, even those courts that embrace the modem position do not in
fact apply CIL to domestic officials, state or federal.217
The federal government's disinclination to apply international
human rights law to domestic officials has been severely criti
cized.218 One problem with these criticisms is that they tend to
214. See supra text accompanying note 194. Even a recent executive order by the Clinton
Administration that purports to implement human rights treaties within the federal executive
branch makes clear that "[n]othing in this order shall create any right or benefit, substantive
or procedural, enforceable by any party against the United States, its agencies or instrumen
talities, its officers or employees, or any other person" and that "[t]his order does not super
sede Federal statutes and does not impose any justiciable obligations on the executive
branch." Implementation of Human Rights Treaties, Exec. Order No. 13107, 63 Fed. Reg.
68,991, 68,993 (1998).
215. See supra text accompanying notes 134-42.
216. See Genocide Convention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988); War
Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (Supp. 1999).
217. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Mark Gibney, Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts: A Hypocritical Ap
proach, 3 BUFF. J. INTI.. L. 261 (1997); Henkin, Ghost of Senator Bricker, supra note 194;
Kenneth Roth, Side-Lined on Human Rights: American Bows Out, FOREIGN AFF., March/
April 1998, at 2.
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overlook the extraordinary human rights protections the United
States offers through its domestic constitutional and democratic
processes. The Bill of Rights, the Reconstruction Amendments,
and federal and state criminal and civil rights laws broadly prohibit
governmental misconduct. It is true, of course, that these domestic
legal protections are not always perfectly enforced. For example,
many of the U.S. police and prison practices that Amnesty Interna
tional recently described as violating international law219 are
equally violative of domestic law. The problem in these contexts is
not an absence of law, but rather insufficient enforcement of and
compliance with domestic law. This serious and complicated prob
lem is to some extent inevitable in all legal systems. Incorporating
international human rights law into domestic law, however, would
not redress this problem.
We do not mean to suggest that international human rights law
and domestic human rights protections are coextensive. In some
instances international human rights law probably recognizes differ
ent and more protective rights than those available under U.S. do
mestic law. When these differences are examined closely, however,
the United States' failure to incorporate international human rights
norms appears less problematic than critics suggest.
The U.S. Constitution, including the Bill of Rights, requires
some of the differences. Thus, for example, the International Cove
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)220 prohibits racial hate
speech,221 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination222 prohibits racist propaganda and requires
elimination of racist organizations.223
organizations

in many instances

are

Because such speech and
protected

by

the First

Amendment, the United States entered reservations refusing to ac219. See AMNEsTY lNrERNATIONAL, Rimrrs FOR ALL 17-86 (1998).
220. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, S.
fame. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
221. See id. art. 20(2), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 29, 999 U.N.T.S. at 178 (prohibiting
"[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimi
nation, hostility or violence").
222. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
223. See id. art. 4(a), S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations
to punish by law "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred"); id. art.
4(b), S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 220 (requiring nations to "declare illegal
and prohibit," and to punish participation in, organizations that "promote and incite racial
discrimination"); id. art. 7, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 5, 660 U.N.T.S. at 222 (requiring nations
to "adopt immediate and effective measures, particularly in the fields of teaching, education,
culture and information, with a view to combating prejudices which lead to racial
discrimination").
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cept these obligations.224 Even in the absence of such reservations,
any political branch consent to these norms would be unenforce
able as domestic law.225
Many of the other supposed differences between the require
ments of international human rights law and U.S. domestic law are
based on tendentious constructions of the relevant human rights
norms, constructions made possible by the vague way in which
these norms are identified and crafted. This vagueness is in tum a
principal reason why the United States does not authorize courts to
apply this law against domestic officials.
International human rights law is vague along two dimensions.
The first type of vagueness concerns the criteria for identifying the
appropriate sources of CIL. Traditionally, a nation was bound
under CIL only to the international obligations to which it had im
plicitly given its consent through customary practice.226 As under
stood by human rights advocates and some courts, modem
international human rights law significantly weakens, if not elimi
nates, these consent and customary practice requirements for
CIL.227 "Customary" international human rights law does not de
pend on actual consent or actual practice, but rather depends on an
"international consensus" constituted by an uncertain brew of
treaty norms (ratified or not), General Assembly resolutions, inter
national commissions, and academic commentators.228 Thus, for
example, some of the Law Lords in the

Pinochet

decision thought

224. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CoNG. REc.
14,326 (1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. REc. 8070-71 (1992). The Genocide
Convention too contains a reservation stating that the United States does not accept any
obligation prohibited by its Constitution. See U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent
to Ratification of the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, 132 CoNG. REc. 2349 (1986).
225. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 324 (1988) ("[I]t is well-established that 'no agree
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."' (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957))).
226. See MARK W. JANis, AN INrn.oouCTioN TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (3d ed.
1999); see also, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that the law of
nations is derived in part from "the customs and usages of civilizec;l nations"); The Antelope,
23 U.S. 66, 120-22 (1825) (observing that the law of nations is derived from "the usages, the
national acts, and the general assent" of the nations of the world).
227. See HENKIN, PoLmcs AND VALUES, supra note 192, at 37-38; Blum & Steinhardt,
supra note 7, at 64-75; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection ofthe Rights of
Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 9-10 (1982).
228. See HENKIN, PoLmcs AND VALUES, supra note 192, at 38; JANIS, supra note 226, at
103-04; Randall, Federal Questions, supra note 6, at 388-93; Steinhardt, supra note 145, at 7981; see also, e.g., Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881-85 (2d Cir. 1980).
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that, based on General Assembly pronouncements and the writings
of scholars, CIL prohibited torture long before ratification of the
Torture Convention.229 Similarly, many commentators claim that
the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders for capital crimes
violates international law, even though this U.S. practice is long
standing, and the United States has expressly declined to consent to
treaties outlawing the practice.230
A second type of vagueness exacerbates the uncertainty prob
lem: even when the

source

of international human rights law is

clear, as is the case with application of duly ratified treaties, the

content

of the norms embodied in the law is often exceedingly

vague. Of course, the language of pertinent U.S. constitutional and
other protections is sometimes similarly vague. These vague do
mestic provisions, however, have been given more precise content
through hundreds and sometimes thousands of judicial decisions.
This large body of interpretive case law certainly does not render
the domestic provisions determinant in all contexts. But it does
provide a broad core of settled meaning at any particular point in
time that sharply contrasts with analogous international provisions.
Consider the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on "unreasona

ble searches and seizures,"231 which is perhaps a paradigmatic ex
ample of an open-ended and indeterminate constitutional
provision. Its requirements have changed over time, and when ap

plied in novel contexts it might well provide little if any real gui
dance. Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted
in thousands of different cases, and these precedents provide police
officials at any particular time with significant guidance.232 The
same cannot be said, for example, of the ICCPR's analogous prohi
bition on "arbitrary arrest or d etention. " 2 33 The Fourth
Amendment and the ICCPR provision are similarly vague as writ229. See, e.g., Second Law Lords' Decision, [1999] 2 W.L.R. 827, 903 (H.L.) (Lord
Saville), 912 (Lord Millett).
230. See, e.g., Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of Inter
national Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655
(1983); Julian S. Nicholls, Too Young to Die: International Law and the Imposition of the
Juvenile Death Penalty in the United States, 5 EMORY !Nn. L. REV. 617 (1991); David Weissb
rodt, Execution of Juvenile Offenders by the United States Violates International Human
Rights Law, 3 AM. U. J. !Nn. L. & PoLY. 339 (1988).
231. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
.

.

232. For an overview of what is generally settled in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
and what is not, see Twenty-Seventh Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J.
1153, 1187-1352 (1998).
233. See ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(1), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at
175.
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ten, but the Fourth Amendment is relatively more determinant in
practice because of the judicial precedents interpreting it.
The vague content of international human rights norms places
the United States in a difficult position. The aims of international
human rights law are often desirable, and it is hard to disagree with
the content of much of this law considered in the abstract. If this
law were incorporated into the U.S. legal system, however, it could
have profound and unforeseen effects on U.S. domestic law.
Although the provisions in human rights treaties often appear to be
similar to the protections available under U.S. domestic law, they
are couched in different terms and it is therefore impossible to pre
dict how these new sources of law would be interpreted and applied
by U.S. judges.
This uncertainty is illustrated by examples from the ICCPR,
perhaps the most important of all human rights treaties. How
would the ICCPR's prohibition on "arbitrary arrest and deten
tion"234 affect the constitutional practice of checkpoint sobriety
stops?235 How would its requirement that an arrestee "be brought
promptly before a judge"236 affect the generally constitutional prac
tice of conducting arraignments within 48 hours of arrest?237
Would its requirement that every "human being" have an "inherent
right to life" that "shall be protected by law"238 strengthen, weaken,
or have no effect on otherwise-legal parental µotification require
ments for juvenile abortions?239 Would the ICCPR's guarantee of
an "enforceable right to compensation" for "[a]nyone who has
been the victim of unlawful arrest or detention"240 override other
wise-legitimate qualified immunity defenses?241 How would the re
quirement that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of
234. See id.
235. See Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (holding that
sobriety checkpoints are legal under the Fourth Amendment).
236. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(3), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
237. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58-59 (1991) (holding that
Fourth Amendment's "promptness" requirement generally is satisfied by arraignment within
48 hours).
238. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 6(1), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174.
239. See Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 297-99 (1997) (upholding constitutionality of
certain parental notification requirements).
240. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 9(5), S. fame. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. 176
(emphasis added).
241. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-56 (1986) (recognizing qualified immunity
defense for unlawful arrests).
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the human person"2 42 affect controversial but constitutional prison
practices?2 43 There are scores of similar uncertainties, under both
the ICCPR and other human rights treaties.
The vagueness of international human rights law is even more
severe in the context of CIL. In that context, there is no text, and
no settled list of sources, to guide interpretation. Moreover, as
noted above, the objective "state practice" component of CIL has
been relaxed in the human rights context.2 4 4 The open-ended na
ture of the CIL of human rights is illustrated by the rapidly ex
panding claims

regarding

its

content.

As late as

1986,

the

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States limited the list of CIL human rights norms to prohibitions
against extremely egregious conduct such as torture and geno
cide.245

Since that time, commentators have argued that CIL in

cludes a wide range of additional rights, including rights relating to
the death penalty, gender violence, and the environment.2 46 And
the list keeps growing. As Ted Meron has observed, "given the
rapid continued development of international human rights, the list
as now constituted should be regarded as essentially open
ended. . . . Many other rights will be added in the course of
time."2 47
The difficulties associated with ascertaining the content of vague
human rights norms are heightened by the fact that the body of
interpretive materials that will eventually provide this content will
not necessarily be based on considerations of U.S. law and policy.
The United States has no privileged say regarding how the vague
norms of international human rights law will come to be viewed in
practice. Such meaning will be determined by the decentralized de
cisions of a variety of national courts, human rights commissions,
other international law bodies, and the writings of scholars.
Although these decisions may in some instances comport with the
views of U.S. policymakers, there is no guarantee that this will be
the case.
242. ICCPR, supra note 220, art. 10(1), S. EXEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176.
243. See Patrick J.A. McClain et al., Prisoners' Rights: Substantive Rights Retained by
Prisoners, 86 GEo. L.J. 1953, 1953-88 (1998).
244. See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
245. See REsrATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 5, § 702.
BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
U.S. CoURTS 86-94 (1996).

246. See, e.g.,
LmoATION

IN

247. THEODOR
99 (1989).

LAW

MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS

AND
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This profound uncertainty regarding the actual content of
human rights norms gives the United States a legitimate reason not
to incorporate international human rights law into domestic law.
International law does not require any particular manner of domes
tic implementation of its obligations, and many nations, including
Great Britain, view all treaties as non-self-executing. The United
States has taken the position that its obligations under the human
rights treaties are fully met by its domestic legal protections, includ
ing, sometimes, domestic legislation implementing particular inter
national obligations. This is a perfectly legitimate method of
respecting international obligations. It is hard to know for sure, of
course, whether U.S. domestic legal protections fully meet the re
quirements of the vague treaty requirements. This is one reason
why the United States, in addition to declaring the human rights
treaties to be non-self-executing, attaches understandings that clar
ify its obligations and narrowly defined reservations that exclude
obligations it cannot meet.
This practice is especially understandable given that the United
States provides extraordinary - though of course far from perfect
- human rights protections through its domestic constitutional and
political processes. The United States agrees with many of the obli
gations in the treaties, at least in the abstract terms in which the
obligations are couched; thus it assents to many of these obligations
in its ratifications. Because these obligations are so uncertain in
practice, however, the United States makes clear that it under
stands the obligations largely to coincide with United States domes
tic law and practice, which, at least in comparison, is relatively
clear.248 This practice does not, as so many commentators claim,
show contempt for international law. By ensuring that the United
States does not assume international obligations that it is not pre
pared to comply with, it arguably shows just the opposite.

248. For examples of such statements in connection with U.S. ratification of human rights
treaties, see U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 140 CONG. RE.c.
14,326 {1994); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Interna
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 138 CoNG. RE.c. 8070-71 (1992); U.S. Senate
Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 136 CoNG. RE.c. 36198-99
{1990); U.S. Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 132 CONG. RE.c.
2349-50 {1986).
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Foreign Officials

The political branches and the courts have been somewhat more
receptive to applying international human rights law against foreign
officials. Even in this context, however, the application of interna
tional human rights law has been quite limited.

Filartiga

and its

progeny have allowed international human rights lawsuits against
foreign officials to proceed under the ATS. As noted above, how
ever, the Supreme Court has made it clear that such ATS suits are
limited by foreign sovereign immunity.249 In addition, in the few
instances in which the political branches have expressly provided
for the application of international human rights law against foreign
officials - for example, in the Torture Victim Protection Act and
the recent terrorism amendments to the FSIA - they sharply lim
ited the types of actions that can be brought, and they also imposed

significant procedural limitations on these actions.250

At first glance, these limitations seem surprising. The United
States has long been a champion of human rights, and it frequently
exercises moral, economic, and military pressure against govern
ments perceived as violating those rights. Why, in this light, would
the United States resist broad application of international human
rights law against foreign officials in U.S. courts?
Part of the answer has to do with fairness concerns implicated
by the substantive and procedural vagueness of international
human rights law. The norms applied under the Filartiga rubric are
generated by the unstructured and open-ended CIL-identification
process discussed above. Moreover, the

Filartiga

approach pro

vides no guidance on important procedural issues like statutes of
limitation, retroactivity, and exhaustion. The uncertainties in the

Filartiga process become clear when one compares it to a rare polit
ical branch incorporation of international human rights law - the
TVPA. The TVPA defined the new federal causes of action for tor
ture and extrajudicial killing with a careful precision that contrasts
with the vague contours of analogous CIL and Torture Convention
prohibitions.251 It provided a statute of limitations designed to
249. See supra text accompanying note 95.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
251. The TVPA's definitions of torture and extrajudicial killing are narrower than those
definitions under CIL and the Torture Convention. They track the definitions adopted by
the Senate's understanding of the requirements of the Torture Convention, which was a con
dition to the Senate's consent to ratification of the treaty. See S. REP. No. 102-249, at 6
(1991).
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avoid stale claims252 and included an exhaustion requirement
designed to avoid unnecessary interference with foreign nations and
undue burden on U.S. courts.253
This latter consideration points to an even more serious concern
regarding the foreign relations implications that inhere in a civil
human rights suit brought against a foreign governmental official.
Such a lawsuit obviously can affect the relations between the nation
permitting the lawsuit and the nation whose officials are subject to
the lawsuit. This foreign relations concern has led most nations of
the world to permit their courts to apply human rights law against
foreign government officials only in criminal suits under the control

of the executive branch. Both the British and Spanish torture
utes at issue in the Pinochet litigation contain this limitation.

stat

The United States appears to be unique in opening its courts to
civil suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign governmental officials
for human rights violations that occurred on foreign soil.254 The
revival of the long-dormant ATS in a context far removed from its
original purposes may not have happened by accident,255 but it did
not come about through a democratic process. Although private
suits under the ATS have sometimes met with the approval of the
executive branch when the private plaintiffs' interests have coin
cided with U.S. foreign policy aims,256 no mechanism in ATS litiga
tion ensures this overlap.257 Instead, private litigants make the
decisions regarding when to bring these lawsuits, which countries to
252. See Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2(c), 106 Stat. 73, 73
(1992) (set forth in statutory note following Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)); see
also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 88 (statute of
limitations requirement "insures that the Federal Courts will not have to hear stale claims").
253. See § 2(b), 106 Stat. at 73; see also H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 5 (exhaustion require
ment "ensures that U.S. courts will not intrude into cases more appropriately handled by
courts where the alleged torture or killing occurred" and avoids "exposing U.S. courts to
unnecessary burdens").
254.

See supra note 145.

255. For a discussion of the role of the Center for Constitutional Rights in the
case, see STEPHENS & RATNER, supra note 246, at 9-10.

Filartiga

256. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d
232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069); Amicus Curiae Brief by the United States
Departments of Justice and State, Ftlartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 796090), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585 (1980). But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu
riae, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989) (No. 86-2448), excerpted in State
Territory, Jurisdiction, and Jurisdictional Immunities, 2 CuMULATIVE DIGEST 1981-1988 § 7,
at 1571-72 (brief from Reagan administration objecting to the use of the ATS for human
rights litigation).
257. In suits against leaders of foreign countries, the Executive does have the ability to
stop human rights litigation by suggesting head-of-state immunity, and it has done so in a
number of instances. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. Most human rights
lawsuits, however, do not implicate head-of-state immunity; in those cases, the Executive is
left with, at most, an amicus curiae role.
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target, and what relief to seek. Neither these litigants, nor the
judges hearing these cases, possess the expertise and constitutional
authority to weigh the benefits of the litigation against its political
costs.258 Moreover, this litigation is highly decentralized and ad
hoc, and it is subject to a variety of procedural restraints that do not
apply to the political process.
These features of U.S. civil litigation help explain why the exec
utive branch has sometimes opposed even very limited measures
aimed at incorporating international human rights law into such liti
gation. Thus, for example, the Bush administration initially op
posed the TVPA259 and the Clinton administration initially opposed
the 1996 amendments to the FSIA,260 both on the ground that even
these limited endorsements of international human rights litigation
would, on balance, harm U.S. foreign relations machinery. For a
similar reason, President Clinton recently declined to exercise his
authority under 1998 Amendments to the FSIA to assist plaintiffs in
recovering human rights judgments against Iran and Cuba.261 As
258. See generally Jack I. Garvey, Judicial Foreign Policy-Making in International Civil
Litigation: Ending the Charade of Separation of Powers, 24 LAW & PoLY. INTL. Bus. 461
{1993); John Yoo, Federal Courts as Weapons of Foreign Policy: The Case of the Helms·
Burton Act, 20 HASTINGS INTL. & CoMP. L.R. 747, 772-75 {1997).
259. See Torture Victim Protection Act of 1989: Hearing on S. 1629 and R.R. 1662 Before
the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,

lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 8 {1990) (written and oral testimony by John 0. McGinnis, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice and David
P. Stewart, Assistant Legal Advisor for Human Rights and Refugee Affairs, U.S. Depart·
ment of State). President Bush did eventually sign the TVPA legislation. Upon signing it,
however, he expressed concern that "U.S. courts may become embroiled in difficult and sen
sitive disputes in other countries, and possibly ill-founded or politically motivated suits,
which have nothing to do with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful
recovery" and that "(s]uch potential abuse of this statute undoubtedly would give rise to
serious frictions in international relations and would also be a waste of our own limited and
already overburdened judicial resources." Statement on Signing the Torture Victim Protec
tion Act of 1991, Mar. 12, 1992, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 465, 466 {Mar. 16, 1992).
260. See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Admin. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 10
{1994) (statement of Jamison S. Borek, Deputy Legal Advisor to U.S. State Department);

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Courts and Ad
min. Practices of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. {1994) (statement
of Stuart Schifter, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of
Justice).
261. In 1998, Congress amended the FSIA to provide for attachment and execution of
otherwise-blocked assets and government assistance in locating the assets in suits against
state sponsors of terrorism. See Pub. L. No. 105-277,,§ 117, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-491 to 2681492 {codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1610{f){l){A), (l){B), {2){A), {2)(B) (Supp.
1999)). Subsection (d) of the 1998 amendment permits the President to waive its require
ments "in the interest of national security." See § 117(d) (codified as amended at statutory
note following 28 U.S.C.A. § 1610 (Supp. 1999) ). The President invoked subsection (d) in an
attempt to waive application of the 1998 amendment in its entirety. See Memorandum on
Blocked Property of Terrorist-List States, Presidential Determination No. 99-1, 34 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2088 (Oct. 21, 1998); see also President's Statement on Signing the Omni-
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these examples illustrate, the incorporation of international human
rights law into the U.S. civil litigation system implicates significant
foreign relations issues. These issues, as we argued above, are best
resolved by the political branches in the first instance.

VI.

Pinochet

CONCLUSION

is a significant decision on many levels. Despite the

Law Lords' narrowing of the extradition charges against Pinochet,
and the fact that Pinochet might well never stand trial in Spain, the
decision is a major victory for the idea that international law can
regulate domestic human rights abuses. More broadly, the decision
has sparked important debates over the legitimacy and efficacy of
unilateral assertions of universal jurisdiction, the relationship be
tween the exercise of this jurisdiction and political solutions (like
amnesties) in the state where the bulk of the human rights abuses
occur, and the virtues and vices of an international criminal court to
try human rights abuses.262

Pinochet

also is significant because it shows that international

law and the mechanisms of its enforcement are changing. Recent
developments in international law, especially in the areas of human
rights and criminal law, have placed substantial pressure on tradi
tional notions of sovereignty, including notions of sovereign immu
nity. Concepts such as universal jurisdiction have increased the
potential enforceability of international law in domestic legal sys
tems. As a result, domestic courts will increasingly face criminal
and civil cases concerning alleged violations of international law.
The United States already has experienced this phenomenon, with
its growing number of civil lawsuits challenging abusive practices
around the world.
Tb.is increased relevance of international law to domestic litiga
tion has the potential to enhance the rule of law in the international
community. It also means, however, that the enforcement of inter
national law will increasingly implicate - and sometimes be in ten
sion with - domestic constitutional standards. We have argued
that, in the United States, the vagueness of international human
bus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, 34 WEEKLY
CoMP. PRES. Doc. 2108 (Oct. 23, 1998). The single court to consider the issue has ruled that
the President's waiver exceeded his authority under the 1998 amendment. See Alejandre v.
Republic of Cuba, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1331-32, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1999), rev'd on other grounds,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18841 (11th Cir. Aug. 11, 1999).
262. For a particularly thoughtful essay on these issues in light of the House of Lords'
first Pinochet decision, see Paul W. Kahn, On Pinochet, 24 BOSTON REvmw, Feb./March
1999, at 18.
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rights law and the foreign policy implications of human rights litiga
tion justify restrictions on the incorporation of international human
rights law into the domestic civil litigation system. In addition, we
have claimed that, for reasons of separation of powers and federal
ism, federal courts should not play an independent role in incorpo
rating international human rights law into the U.S. legal system but
should instead await authorization and direction from the federal
political branches. The Pinochet decision reduces some of the bar
riers to the enforcement of international human rights law, at least
in criminal prosecutions of former heads of state. The decision also
provides support, however, for the limited and politically controlled
approach to civil human rights litigation that we have suggested.

